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All the policies of Latin American States, for almost 180 years,
were geared toward the elimination of forms of collective property
and autonomous forms of government of the indigenous
peoples. . . . [T]hose communities which have managed to attain
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support from the State to develop an economy within those spaces
[have] prove[n] that maintaining the communal system becomes
a very powerful force for transformation and development for the
benefit of these communities and of the respective countries.***
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1. The word “polygon” appears in various Latin American legal documents referring to
communal land.  For example, article 1 of a law in Panama refers to the “polígono” which is the
object of the law.  Ley No. 24, 12 Jan. 1996, Por la cual se crea la Comarca Kuna de
Madungandi [By Which the the Kuna de Madungandi Region Is Created] ch. I, art. 1, Gaceta
Oficial [G.O.], 15 Jan. 1996 (Pan.), available at http://www.asamblea.gob.pa/NORMAS/1990/
1996/1996_138_0699.PDF.  For another example, see Decreto Supremo No. 25,920, 6 Oct.
2000, art. 150 (Bol.), available at http://www2.iadb.org/sds/IND/ley/docs/BO-7.htm. 
2. ROGER PLANT & SOREN HVALKOF, LAND TITLING AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Inter-Am.
Dev. Bank, Sustainable Dev. Dep’t Best Practices Series No. IND-109, 2001), available at
http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/IND-109E.pdf.
3. This school of thought says that when land becomes a scarce resource due to population
pressure, market integration occurs, and this drives increasing individualization of land rights
as the most efficient form of land use.  This development, in turn, leads to establishment of a
formalized system of the state to protect individualized private property.  This is referred to as
the evolutionary theory of land rights (ETLR).  For an overview and critique of ETLR in its
development application to Africa, see Jean Philippe Platteau, The Evolutionary Theory of Land
Rights as Applied to Sub-Sahara Africa: A Critical Assessment, 27 DEV. & CHANGE 29 (1996)
(Neth.).  A more recent critique of ETLR notes that the theory is just that — a theory — and is
not based on concrete examples.  LYNN ELLSWORTH, A PLACE IN THE WORLD: TENURE
SECURITY AND COMMUNITY LIVELIHOODS, A LITERATURE REVIEW 9 n.7 (2002).
4. See, e.g., infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN
ARGENTINA [CONST. ARG.] art. 17 (noting that private property is inviolable).
5. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 65-69 (1990); Robert McC. Netting, What Alpine
Peasants Have in Common: Observations on Communal Tenure in a Swiss Village, 4 HUM.
I. Introduction: The Polygon1 Explained
For many peoples in the developing world, “homeland security” has a
meaning very different from its post-September 11 meaning in the United
States.  In many cases, peoples who have a shared cultural conception of
“territory” within nation-states have begun to adopt the dominant western
property paradigm of land titling to formalize their rights to that territory.2
Many view this paradigm and the individualization of property rights it
facilitates as an inevitable outcome of the inexorable march of social
evolution, evidenced by the end of the twentieth century collapse of
communism.3  The Enlightenment era conception of fungible individual
property emerged triumphant.  Moreover, it has been enshrined in the
fundamental human rights charters and domestic constitutions of the twentieth
century.4  Yet a closer inspection yields a much more nuanced analysis of the
nature and forms of property ownership around the world and its treatment
within the rights-based framework of humanitarian law.  The literature
suggests that communally held lands, often referred to as “common property,”
have remained robust and adaptable in the face of the forces of globalization,
and continue to persist in even the most developed nations.5  
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ECOLOGY 135 (1976) (Neth.) (discussing the stability of a mix of communal and individual
property in Swiss villages from the thirteenth century until the present and ascribing this to the
appropriateness of communal tenure to certain areas based on the land use); José Heder Benatti,
The Common Property and the Community Forest Management in the Brazilian Amazon Forest
3 n.7 (Aug. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Tenth Conference of the
International Association for the Study of Common Property held in Oaxaca, Mex.), http://
dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001341/00/Benatti_Common_040512_Paper251b.pdf.
6. KLAUS DEININGER, WORLD BANK GROUP, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY
REDUCTION, at xlv (2003).
7. Id. at 66-67.
8. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing aboriginal title in Canada); id. Part IV.A.4
(discussing native title in Australia); id. note 225 and accompanying text (discussing domestic
laws evidencing the importance of recognizing communal lands).
9. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
Formal recognition of communal land rights may be increasing in some
parts of the world.  We contend that the international human rights system,
through its generationally described “progressive development,” represents a
key factor in this trend, as states seek to reconcile the dominant western liberal
model of property as a marketable commodity with deeply rooted non-
Western cultural conceptions of property as homeland.  In the parlance of the
common law of property, the “bundle of sticks” that is the human right to
property includes the associated and indivisible rights to life and health,
religion, and culture among others.  A recent World Bank research report
acknowledged that noneconomic factors, including human rights, must be
considered in the development of land policy, even at a cost to market
efficiencies.6  In many cases, the report concludes, land policy will best be
served by recognizing and guaranteeing customary land tenure arrangements,7
a conclusion reached by a growing number of nations, by domestic courts, and
most recently, by international human rights tribunals.8
This Article begins with a brief review of the literature of common
property — an area of intense and interdisciplinary scholarly interest sparked
by Garrett Hardin’s famous essay, The Tragedy of the Commons.9  In Part II
we briefly review the modern view of common property and its relationship
with international development theory.  Part III describes the historical
development of the three-generational conceptual framework for international
human rights law and the right to property within that framework.  Part IV
discusses key national jurisprudence that has attempted to reverse the colonial
legacy of indigenous homeland alienation and the inter-American human
rights system.  
In Part V, we turn our attention to the basis for finding an international
human right to communal property.  Part VI examines the nature and quality
of the property rights conferred on communal lands, especially the distinction
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/1
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10. Id.
11. See LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND
COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995); ELINOR
OSTROM, CRAFTING INSTITUTIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNING IRRIGATION SYSTEMS (1992)
[hereinafter OSTROM, CRAFTING INSTITUTIONS]; OSTROM, supra note 5; ELINOR OSTROM,
UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005); THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
(Nives Dolšak & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2003); Elinor Ostrom, How Types of Goods and Property
Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 239 (2003).
between a title and the reservation or trust theories often used to confer
territorial rights within states.  We conclude that in many cases, there is little
substantive distinction, and that any preference for titles represents as much
a political as a legal determination.  In Part VII we address the application of
this developing form of international property law to both nonindigenous and
tribal peoples.  We conclude that the international human rights system
represents a key driver in the formalization of communal property
arrangements in Latin America, and that the spatial extent of such formally
recognized land may be increasing as a result.  Whether this represents a long-
term trend, or a bubble that will be burst by forces both within and without
“the polygon,” remains to be determined.
II. The Commons Literature of Common Property
Most commentators trace the enterprise of common property scholarship
to Garrett Hardin’s famous 1968 essay, The Tragedy of the Commons.10
Hardin theorized that, in the absence of the ability to exclude that comes with
individualized property ownership, a tragedy would ensue as the number of
individuals with unlimited access to a resource sought to exploit that resource.
Hardin’s work assumed that the commons had no rules controlling access and
use.  Nevertheless, this is not the reality for most of the tenure situations
Hardin had in mind, which actually include sophisticated property
relationships involving group ownership and management of land and
resources.  These tenure regimes have come to be known as “common
property resources” or CPR.  The CPR movement, led by the intellectual
leader of the common property movement, Elinor Ostrom, sought to debunk
the oversimplification of Hardin’s commons.  In a series of publications,
Ostrom and others distinguished Hardin’s “open access” regimes — as she
preferred to call them — with the complex, highly organized, rules-based
regimes for property held in the name of a group of persons — common
property regimes.11  Foremost among these rules is that basic notion of
western property law — the ability to exclude those without proprietary rights.
Ostrom pointed to successful group property management regimes throughout
the world that have endured for centuries, surviving the inexorable march of
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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12. See, e.g., OSTROM, CRAFTING INSTITUTIONS, supra note 11, at 10-11, 67-79; OSTROM,
supra note 5, at 58-102.  For an example of work by another author looking at communal land
in modern times, see RUTH BEHAR, SANTA MARÍA DEL MONTE 189-264 (1986). 
13. See International Association for the Study of the Commons Home Page, http://www.
indiana.edu/~iascp/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
14. See Digital Library of the Commons, http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/ (last visited Apr. 13,
2007).  
15.  Thomas Dietz et al., Introduction to NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DRAMA OF THE
COMMONS 3 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS];
Nives Dolšak & Elinor Ostrom, The Challenges of the Commons, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM, supra note 11, at 3, 7-8; see also David Feeny, Fikret Berkes, Bonnie J. McCay
& James M. Acheson, The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-two Years Later, 18 HUM.
ECOLOGY 1, 3-5 (1990).  
16. Scholars usually take care to distinguish between “common-pool resources” and “public
goods.”  
A public good is something to which everyone has access but, unlike a common-pool
resource, one person’s use of the resource does not necessarily diminish the potential for
use by another.  Public radio stations, scientific knowledge, and world peace are public
goods in that we all enjoy the benefits without reducing the quantity or quality of the
good.  
Dietz et al., supra note 15, at 3-5. 
17. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public
Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2003).
colonial property law.12  Ostrom’s work kindled an academic movement that
has yielded its own scholarly association,13 digital database,14 and a plethora
of followers — many of whom are seeking viable alternatives to the neoliberal
development model of unfettered individualization and commoditization of
property.
Common property terminology can be confusing and sometimes politicized.
Other common terms for the same or similar concept include group,
cooperative, communal, and collective ownership.  The latter two conjure up
visions of the socialist state.  In Latin America the term common property is
translated to “propiedad collective,” literally “collective property.”  These are
merely labels, however, for a variety of forms of property ownership, some of
which are staples of the neoliberal political economy.  Cooperatives,
condominiums, and even corporations all enjoy a place on the continuum of
group property arrangements.  Common property scholars also employ the
term “common-pool resources” in describing shared ownership of natural
resources such as fisheries, irrigation systems, forests, pastures, and hunting
grounds.15  The term “commons” is also employed to describe physical spaces
outside of the jurisdiction of domestic legal regimes, such as the high seas and
the upper atmosphere.16 More recently common property literature has spilled
from its tangible origins into the realm of intellectual property and the
internet, evidenced by the work of legal scholar Carol Rose.17
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/1
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18. Peter J. Richerson, Robert Boyd & Brian Paciotti, An Evolutionary Theory of Commons
Management, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 15, at 403.
19. The history of the prisoner’s dilemma is itself quite interesting:
XXPuzzles with this structure were devised and discussed by Merrill Flood and
Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand Corporation’s investigations into
game theory (which Rand pursued because of possible applications to global
nuclear strategy).  The title “prisoner’s dilemma” and the version with prison
sentences as payoffs are due to Albert Tucker, who wanted to make Flood and
Dresher's ideas more accessible to an audience of Stanford psychologists.
Although Flood and Dresher didn’t themselves rush to publicize their ideas in
external journal articles, the puzzle attracted widespread attention in a variety of
disciplines.  Christian Donninger reports that “more than a thousand articles”
about it were published in the sixties and seventies.  A bibliography (Axelrod and
D’Ambrosio) of writings between 1988 and 1994 that pertain to Robert Axelrod's
research on the subject lists 209 entries.  Since then the flow has shown no signs
of abating.
Steven Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N.
Zalta ed., 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.
20. Shirli Kopelman, J. Mark Weber & David M. Messick, Factors Influencing
Cooperation in Commons Dilemmas: A Review of Experimental Psychological Research, in
THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 15, at 113.
21. See, e.g., Platteau, supra note 3 (describing the evolutionary theory of property rights).
22. Cf. PETER J. RICHERSON & ROBERT BOYD, NOT BY GENES ALONE: HOW CULTURE
TRANSFORMED HUMAN EVOLUTION 197-229 (2005) (discussing cooperation among groups in
the context of human cultural evolution).
Central to the discourse concerning the viability of common property
regimes is the effort to understand why humans cooperate, particularly when
faced with the choice between sacrifice and self-preservation.  This discussion
is rooted in social sciences and often expresses itself through something
known as “rational choice theory.”18  The archetypal manifestation of this is
the famous “prisoner’s dilemma” in which the rational choice is to rat on your
accomplice in exchange for freedom, rather than each of you refusing to admit
guilt (without knowing what the other will do) and thereby securing freedom
for both.19  Laden with assumptions, this game theory model remains a staple
in the theoretical discussion of approaches to human social organization, and
to “commons dilemmas” as they are sometimes called.20  
The evolutionary end game for many property theorists is the
individualization of property and its treatment as a commodity for market.21
Common property theory tends to confound rational choice dogma and its
expression in property theory, since it is based on cooperation.  Yet some
contend that common property regimes simply represent an evolutionary
strategy of group rather than individual selection, based on human cultural
evolution.22   
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23. OSTROM, supra note 5. 
24. Arun Agrawal, Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability, in THE DRAMA OF
THE COMMONS, supra note 12, at 41.
25. E.g., Catherine Tucker, Common Property Design Principles and Development in a
Honduran Community, PRAXIS: FLETCHER J. DEV. STUD., May 1999, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/
praxis/archives/xv/Tucker.pdf.  
26. OSTROM, supra note 5.
27. See, e.g., World Bank Group, Common Property Resources: A Missing Dimension of
Development Strategies, Rep. No. WDP169 (Aug. 31, 1992) (prepared by N.S. Jodha),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
1999/09/17/000178830_98101903551568/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
28. See, e.g., GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE 35 (1999) (quoting Mary Robinson, U.N. Human Rights Commissioner).
29. The Secretary-General, Ensuring a Smooth Transition of Countries Graduating from
Least Developed Country Status,¶ 10, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc.
E/2001/94 (July 27, 2001), available at  http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/docs/2001/e
2001-94.pdf.  Latin America demonstrates the tenacity of the problem of poverty.  See generally
Jaime Saavedra & Omar S. Arias, Stuck in a Rut, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2005, at 18.
The holy grail of common property research has been the discovery of those
factors that contribute to durable and successful common property regimes
wherever they are found.  Considerable ink has been spilled describing and
applying “design principles” to different common property arrangements
around the world.  Ostrom identified eight “principles” necessary for the
success of common property regimes,23 which another scholar refers to as
“critical enabling conditions.”24  These have all been applied empirically in
literally thousands of contexts around the world.25  Ostrom’s principles
include (1) clearly defined access rights and boundaries; (2) rules governing
resource use and contribution of labor, material, or money; (3) participation
rights in rules modification; (4) resource monitoring systems; (5) graduated
sanctions; (6) conflict resolution mechanisms; (7) recognition of legitimacy
by external governments or institutions; and (8) for larger systems, “nested
enterprises” to tackle complementary responsibilities.26
The study of common property is closely linked to another scholarly pursuit
that has significant implications beyond the pages of arcane social science
journals — development theory.27  Researchers and policymakers alike have
been desperately seeking to identify those governance institutions that yield
the greatest return on development assistance investments, especially in
marginalized rural areas.  Fifty years of development assistance policy from
western democracies to developing countries has yielded a low return on
investment.28  Only one country — Botswana — has “graduated” from the
ranks of “least-developed countries,” and poverty remains at extraordinarily
high levels.29  Moreover, most development assistance makes implicit or
explicit assumptions concerning the institutional and economic models most
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/1
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30. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
31. See, e.g., DEININGER, supra note 5, at xxviii-xxix.
32. Kevin Barthel, Grenville Barnes & Trevor Greening, Effective Tools for Cadastral
Surveying in Latin America and the Caribbean (Oct. 2005) (unpublished PowerPoint
presentation, presented at the Trimble Dimensions 2005 User Conference held in Las Vegas,
Nev.) (on file with authors).
33. See, e.g., Envtl. Def., Fact Sheet: World Bank Market Based Land Reform (Apr. 2002),
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/2367_WorldBankMarketBasedLandRefor
m.pdf.
34. See, e.g., Indian Law Resource Center, Land Rights and Environment, http://www.
indianlaw.org/main/projects/landrights (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).  The Indian Law Resource
Center participated in the Awas Tingni case.  Indian Law Resource Center, Nicaragua / Awas
Tingni Case, http://www.indianlaw.org/main/projects/past_projects/nicaragua (last visited Apr.
12, 2007).  The Indian Law Resource Center also supported the Danns in their complaint to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  Indian Law Resource Center, Western
Shoshone / Dann Case, http://www.indianlaw.org/main/projects/past_projects/ws_dann (last
visited Apr. 12, 2007).
35. E-mail from Grenville Barnes, Assoc. Professor of Geomatics, Univ. of Fla., to Thomas
Ruppert, Asst. in Envt’l Law, Univ. of Fla.  (Feb. 15, 2007, 12:16 PM) (on file with authors).
36. Property records and alienation of property through sale had existed for more than a
likely to lead to development and often imposes conditions on assistance
designed to promote those models.  The development of individual property
markets has been one of the most vigorously promoted development assistance
policies.  Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto and his book The Mystery of
Capital have been highly influential in this regard.30  Land titling and
registration projects are a staple in the portfolio of international lending
institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank,31 and over one billion U.S. dollars have been invested in these efforts
in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1996.32  Market-based land reform
represents the latest addition to this portfolio.33
More recently, common property regimes have been promoted by human
rights advocates seeking to secure a place in the world for indigenous groups
and traditional societies whose values and traditional tenure conflict with the
dominant western property paradigm.34  The wisdom of “protecting” common
property through use of property titles is debatable; due to its basis in western
property law, title may not be the best instrument for accommodating
complex, communal/individual property systems.35
III. The Emergence of a Rights-Based Approach to Property
While the individualization of property and the development of western
legal institutions to protect individual property may have developed in ancient
Rome,36 the modern concept of individual property ownership as a right that
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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millennium in the Middle East before the Western legal tradition began to develop these in the
Roman era.  See, e.g., Johannes M. Renger, Institutional, Communal, and Individual Ownership
or Possession of Arable Land in Ancient Mesopotamia from the End of the Fourth to the End
of the First Millennium B.C., 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 269, 290-93 (1995).  
37. See, e.g., JOHN W. JEUDWINE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY AND THE LAND 32 (1975);
cf. id. at 34 (noting that land for cultivation was apportioned not to individuals but to extended
family groups or clans). 
38. See, e.g., RUTH BEHAR, SANTA MARÍA DEL MONTE 189-264 (1986) (describing current
communal attributes of a rural Spanish village as a “web of use rights”). 
39.  See MAGNA CARTA art. 39 (1215) (Eng.), translated in JAMES CLARKE HOLT, MAGNA
CARTA 327 (1965).
40. Id. (“No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in
any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement [sic] of his
peers or by the law of the land.”).
41. The Bill of Rights of England of 1689 (an Act declaring the rights and liberties of the
subject and settling the succession of the crown) sought to limit the permissible powers of the
sovereign authority but did not contain any express reference to property.  See DAVID
ROBERTSON, A DICTIONARY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 246-49 (Paul Kelly ed., 2d ed. 2004).  See
generally Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M. 67, c. 36 (Eng.).
42. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU
CITOYEN [DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN] art. 17 (Fr. 1789),
translated at Avalon Project: Declaration of the Rights of Man, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/rightsof.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2007) (“Since property is an inviolable and sacred
offers individual protection against state interference did not fully manifest
itself until much later.  In the interim period of western history, property went
through tremendous changes and experienced radically different treatments in
different areas.  For example, in most of Europe two thousand years ago, lands
were communal and were frequently reapportioned according to the changing
needs of the community.37  Despite the rise of individual private property,
some communal lands have persisted in developed western countries well into
the twentieth century.38  
The importance of land in feudal Europe made property largely
synonymous with power.  Arbitrary exercise of power by kings led to
development of the Magna Carta in 1215 as a means to limit the authority of
the state.  The Magna Carta foreshadowed the political expression of property
ownership as a basic attribute of humanity by forbidding unwarranted
interference in the possession of private property.39  This early expression of
the rights of man against the sovereign provided that no person could be
disseised of property “except by the lawful judgement [sic] of his peers or by
the law of the land.”40  Centuries passed after the Magna Carta before the next
important documents supporting a human right to property appeared in the
Enlightenment era.  While not all declarations that were intended to limit the
arbitrary exercise of sovereign power included a reference to property,41 most
did.42
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/1
2006] DEFENDING THE POLYGON 691
right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall
clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and
equitably indemnified.”); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 544 (Fr.), translated at Napoleon Series,
French Civil Code, http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/code/book2/c_title02
.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007) (“Property is the right of enjoying and disposing of things in
the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by the laws or
statutes.”)  The Napoleonic code was first published in 1804. 
43. A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A RECORD OF THE EVENTS,
DOCUMENTS, AND SPEECHES THAT SHAPED OUR WORLD 4 (Jon E. Lewis ed., 2003).
44. Id. at 5.
45. HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION, 1600 TO THE PRESENT 1 (John A. Maxwell
& James J. Friedberg eds., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS].
46. The Romans inherited the concept of natural law — lex naturæ — from the Greek
Stoics.  For the Stoics “nature” meant the sum of the universe of things, and this universe had
a determining force: the law of nature.  This law governed not only nature but also the actions
of man and thus became associated with morality.  As recipients of the Greek conception of
natural law related to morality, Romans incorporated the natural law idea into their practice of
law by appealing to nature when strict adherence to the written law would have created a moral
wrong.  HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 1; THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN 15 (1st Am. ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1876). 
47. HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 1 n.1.
48. Cf. Eduardo Moises Penalver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International
Before delving deeper into the development of an international human right
to property, a brief review of human rights law itself will contribute to a better
understanding of the philosophical bases of the right to property and the nexus
between the two.
A. The Rise of Universality, Natural Law, and International Law
The philosophic and historic foundations for human rights go back
millennia.  The trend began in the west with the ancient Greeks, who placed
considerable value on the dignity and rights of the individual person.43
Christianity also plays a role in the early beginnings of human rights due to
the focus in Christianity on the importance of each individual person,44 and
because of Christianity’s concept of universalism — the assertion that there
is one truth and law that applies to all.45  An even more important historical
growth of universalism appeared when the ancient Romans espoused the
concept of Natural Law.46  Natural law posits existence of a law independent
of human authority.  Natural law can flow from a divine power, human
rationality, or nature itself.47  While a full examination of the natural law
concept is beyond the scope of the present work, suffice it to state here that
the late medieval theologian St. Thomas Aquinas served to link the natural law
exposition of Aristotle to the secular Enlightenment thinkers and down to the
present.48
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Norms, and the Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107, 156 (2000).
Some argue that even modern Catholic doctrine supports the natural-law right to property, but
that this “right” to property is properly construed as very limited since “the goods of this world
are originally meant for all.”  Brendan Hennigan, A Comparison of Henry George’s Economic
Theory of Justice with the Catholic Church’s Social Teachings Concerning the Right to Private
Property in Land n.10 (July 23, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Council of
Georgis t s  Organ izat ions  Conference held  in  Albuquerque,  N.M.) ,
http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/hennigan-brendan_hgeorge_and_catholic_
teachings.html (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-II., Q. 66, art. 2; POPE
PAUL VI, POPULORUM PROGRESSIO [ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLES] No. 22 (1967);
VATICAN II, GAUDIUM ET SPES [JOY AND HOPE] pt. II, ch. 3, § 2, No. 69, at 248-49 n.78 (1965)).
The inherent limitations on private property have been compared to a “social mortgage.”  Id.
Similarly, the Jesuits in Latin America have long been known for their stance on liberation
theology.  To this day, the Jesuits continue to take a stance they believe promotes the interests
of the poor by arguing that all private property must serve a social function and that private
property is subject to a “social mortgage.”  RICARDO ANTONCICH, COORDINADORES DEL
APOSTOLADO SOCIAL, HISTORIA DEL SECTOR SOCIAL (13): PRIMER ENCUENTRO [A HISTORY OF
THE SOCIAL SECTOR (13): FIRST ENCOUNTER] ¶ 211 (1991), http://www.cpalsj.org/cgi/cgilua.
exe/sys/start.htm?sid=6 (search “Texto” for “hipoteca social”; then follow “Historia del Sector
Social (13): Primer Encuentro” hyperlink).
49. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bobroff, Francisco de Vitoria, John Marshall y las justificaciones
jurídicas de la colinización de América [Francisco de Vitoria, John Marshall, and Legal
Justifications for Colonization in the Americas],
5 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA 641 (2002) (Spain),
translated at http://lawschool.unm.edu/faculty/bobroff/Bobroff%20Spain%20Final%20Draft.
pdf.
50. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon
Press 1925) (1646).
51. HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 45, at 2.  The rise of natural law has not been linear; it has
ebbed and flowed over time.  For instance, during the nineteenth century, positivism — a focus
on empirical phenomenon and exclusion of theology or metaphysical assumptions — gained
ground over natural law.  Id. at 6.  Such ascendance particularly dealt with war; many
international lawyers and scholars of the nineteenth century felt that the right to wage war was
an inherent part of state sovereignty and thus could not, by definition, be limited by anyone.
Ultimately, the development of human rights law and international law
cannot be separated.  As early as the sixteenth century, the Spanish lawyer,
theologian, and philosopher, Franciscus de Vitoria, argued on secular natural
law grounds for greater respect of the rights of Native Americans.49  This
foreshadowed by about a century the writings of Hugo Grotius, a Dutch
Protestant often considered the founding father of international law, who
wrote The Law of War and Peace.50  Many know this work as the first
comprehensive collection of rules governing aspects of warfare, but the
importance of Grotius’s work extends beyond rules of warfare: it also
represented a legal treatise assuming that individuals have rights to certain
minimum standards of treatment under international law.51
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Id.  After the world witnessed the slaughter of World War I, it became apparent that advocating
the right of any state to wage war when it wished, combined with increasingly modern warfare,
created a recipe for tremendous destruction.  Id.  The short-lived League of Nations represented
the realization that war should not be an acceptable way for countries to interact and that
aggressive war was illegal.  Positivism’s unlimited concept of sovereignty never, however,
entirely replaced the belief that sovereignty is limited by some higher moral authority than the
state.  Id. at 3.
52. Id. at 2. 
53.  Locke played an important role in developing the western world’s sense of property.
See L. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Instituion: The Separation of Property from
Sovereignty in International Law, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 263, 266-70 (1997).  While John
Locke may be the best-known advocate of private property as a part of natural law, he is not the
only one.  Id.  Locke’s influential writing about property appears in his Second Treatise of Civil
Government.  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 25-34 (Lester DeKoster
ed., William B. Eerdmans Publ’g Co. 1978) (1690).
54. See, e.g., Victor Rodríguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The Development of the Inter-
American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and a Moderen-Day Critique, 16
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593, 596 (2000) (citing PEDRO NIKKEN, LA PROTECCIÓN
INTERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS: SU DESARROLLO PROGRESIVO [THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ITS PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT] 39 (1987)).
55. See DAVID H. OTT, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 238 (1987);
Prudence E. Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in
International Law?, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 317 (1998); GREG MAGGIO & OWEN J.
LYNCH, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L., HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: EXISTING AND EMERGING STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL
SOCIETY pt. V (Nov. 15, 1997), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/olp3v.html.
As with the Spaniard Vitoria and St. Thomas Aquinas before him, Grotius
founded his arguments and beliefs on natural law.  However, Grotius
separated natural law from the divine and believed that human reason could
uncover natural law.52  This secularization of natural law continued with the
Enlightenment in Europe during the seventeenth century, with a focus on
those certain “inalienable truths” from which all other law flows.  Foremost
among Enlightenment thinkers was John Locke, generally credited with
enshrining the individual right to property among the higher order “self-
evident” truths that include life and liberty.53  These natural law “truths”
formed the bases for fundamental human rights.
B. Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité: Three Generations of Human Rights
Laws
The contemporary international system of human rights emerged in the
aftermath of World War II.54  This progressive development of human rights
is often described generationally, inspired by the serial application of the
themes of the French Revolution — liberty, equality, and fraternity.55  Under
this admittedly crude framework, the first generation of rights (liberty)
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56. MARY DOWELL-JONES, CONTEXTUALISING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC DEFICIT 14 (2004).
57. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2, 6-9, 14, 16, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
58. Cf. DOWELL-JONES, supra note 56, at 14.
59. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights arts. 8-10, 12-13,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
60. See, e.g., PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 1-2 (Philip Alston ed., 2001) (referring to the right to self-
determination as the “single most important and most frequently invoked of the [third-
generation] rights”).  Note that the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples specifically states that use of the word “peoples” does not “hav[e] any implication with
respect to any other rights that might be attached to that term in international law.”  Inter-Am.
Comm’n on Human Rights, Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, art. I, ¶ 3, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. (Mar. 14, 1997), available at http://
www.cidh.org/indigenas/indigenas.en.01/preamble.htm.  Drafters added this clause to address
concerns that use of the word “peoples” could subsequently invoke the right to self-
determination accorded to peoples under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 57, art. 1, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, supra note 59, art. 1.  At one point, some argued that the concept of self-determination
meant that indigenous peoples should have complete independence from the countries that de
facto controlled them; the international community roundly rejected this view.  RHONA K.
SMITH, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 272 (2003).  Most of those involved in
indigenous issues recognize the reality that the right to self-determination means neither
absolute, independent sovereignty for indigenous groups nor that the states in which they find
themselves are an homogenous whole without responsibility to give considerations to the self-
determination rights of indigenous groups within their borders.  See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury,
Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in
International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189, 222-24 (2001).
represent the Enlightenment-inspired individual civil and political rights,56
such as the right to judicial remedies, the right to be free from racial
discrimination, the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of the right to
life, the right to be free from torture, the right to be free of slavery, the rights
to liberty and security of the person, the right to be presumed innocent of a
crime until proven guilty, and the right to recognition as a person before the
law.57  Second-generation human rights (equality) emerged as part of the late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century growth of socialism in response to
social and economic disparity that interfered with the full exercise of first-
generation rights.58  Included among these are the right to education, the right
to health care and social security, the right to protection of the family, and the
right to form unions.59  Nascent third-generation rights (fraternity) remain
amorphous, but are generally characterized as group or community rights to
global resources and power sharing such as the right to the self-determination
of peoples,60 language, culture, and the emerging right to a healthy
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61. Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or
Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?, 29  NETH. INT’L L. REV. 307, 307 (1982);
see also Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 442-50 (1981).
62. DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU CITOYEN [DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS
OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN] art. 17 (Fr. 1789), translated at Avalon Project: Declaration of
the Rights of Man, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/rightsof.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2007)
(“Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where
public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the
owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.”).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The American Declaration of Independence did not include the
right to property in its listing of  “self-evident truths,” which included life and liberty but
substituted the pursuit of happiness for property.   THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.
2 (U.S. 1776).    
64. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948).
65. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 21, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
66. Int’l Conference of Am. States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
Res. XXX, art. XXIII, OEA/ser.L/V/I.4 (May 2, 1948), reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW &
WORLD ORDER doc. III.B.23 (Burns H. Weston & Jonathan C. Carlson eds., Mar. 2003).
environment.61  These generational classifications are neither ironclad nor
mutually exclusive.  The human right to property cuts across all three.
1. First-Generation Human Rights: Property as Liberté
The Lockean notion of property as an inherent right derived from nature
was incorporated into the fundamental political charters of the Enlightenment:
the French Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen62 and the American
Bill of Rights.63  These charters in turn served as the basis for the “first
generation” of human rights: individual guarantees of civil and political
freedom.
The foundation of the contemporary human rights system is the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which represents a codification of the
first generation of human rights.  Included among these is the right to
property.  Article 17 of the Universal Declaration provides, “Everyone has the
right to own property alone as well as in association with others.”64  The right
to property is also enshrined in article 21 of the 1969 American Convention
on Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his
property.”65  The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
protects the right to own property in article 23: “Every person has a right to
own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and
helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.”66  This
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67. E.g., Council of Europe, Protocol (No. 1) to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S.
221, Europ. T.S. No. 9 (“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions.”); Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (“The right to property shall be guaranteed.  It may
only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.”).   
68. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 59, arts.
6, 8-9, 11-12, 13-15.
69. RICARDO Z. ZELEDÓN, DERECHO AGRARIO Y DERECHOS HUMANOS [AGRARIAN LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 27 (2003).  Others, however, question the validity of such a simple
distinction.  For example, some first-generation rights — such as that to a speedy trial — require
a substantial positive investment on the part of the state, whereas some second-generation
rights — such as the right to unionize — require little expenditure on the part of the state.
DOWELL-JONES, supra note 56, at 4.  
70. DOWELL-JONES, supra note 56, at 14 (citing Richard L. Siegel, Socioeconomic Human
Rights: Past and Future, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 255, 260 (1985) (noting that socioeconomic rights also
have “feudal, mercantilist, Methodist, utilitarian, radical, conservative, Roman Catholic[,] and
even liberal” roots)).
71. See generally Thomas T. Ankersen & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: The Social
international recognition of individual property rights can also be found in
other regional charters.67
2. Second-Generation Human Rights: Property as Égalité
The expression of second-generation social and economic rights emerged
in the political context of the rise of twentieth-century socialism and thus did
not find the same universal application first-generation rights have found.
These rights are expressed in the United Nations’ Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, and include, inter alia, the rights to work, to
form trade unions, to access to universal compulsory education, to social
security, to health care, to culture, and to freedom from hunger.68  Some
assert that second-generation rights are distinct from first-generation rights
in that second-generation rights require positive action on the part of the
state for their realization.69  Regardless of where one tries to draw the line
between first- and second-generation rights, the recognition of second-
generation rights as part of the development of modern socialism should not
obscure that many second-generation rights have much deeper and more
varied roots than the socialism with which they are often associated.70  
The influence of the socio-political philosophy from which the second
generation of human rights emerged has influenced the role that property
fills in some societies.  This can be found in the development of the legal
gloss of “social function” found in most Latin American constitutions and
codes,71 and in the American Convention on Human Rights.72  Under the
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Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 69 (2006).
72. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 65, art. 21, para. 1 (providing that
“[t]he law may subordinate such use and enjoyment [of property] to the interest of society”);
see also ZELEDÓN, supra note 69, at 41-48 (reviewing the historical development of the social
function doctrine and arguing for the progressive interpretation of human rights law to include
agrarian rights as a second-generation human right); Steven E. Hendrix, Property Law
Innovation in Latin America with Recommendations, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV 1, 7-8
(1995) (reviewing the constitutional bases for the social function doctrine in Latin American
constitutions).  
73. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 71, at 98-99.
74. Id. at 98-106.
75. Taylor, supra note 50, at 318-19.  These rights have also been referred to as “solidarity
rights.”  PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, supra note 54, at 2.
76. PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 1.
77. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (June 13, 1992) (“The right to development must be fulfilled so as to
equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 877 (1992); United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14
(June 16, 1972) (“The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and
fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the
benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as
appropriate.”), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1419 (1972); see also Edith Brown Weiss, Our
Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198
(1990).
social function doctrine, individualized property retains an obligation to
serve society or the property is at risk of expropriation.73  In Latin America
the social function doctrine has served as the basis for twentieth-century
agrarian reform movements and massive land redistribution programs
designed to break up large land holdings.74  
3. Third-Generation Human Rights: Property as Fraternité
Third-generation human rights represent the latest “progressive
development” in this area of international law.75  Third-generation rights,
most of which have not yet found their way into binding human rights
charters, include the right to peace, development, and a healthy
environment,76 as well as the notion of intergenerational equity.77  Included
among these, and especially relevant for the purposes of this discussion, are
the rights to culture and community.  A key attribute of the third generation
is the recognition of what have come to be called “group rights.”  Through
the domestic and international cases and treaties discussed in this Article,
these rights have been seized upon by indigenous groups and their advocates
and related back to the first-generation individual right of property to create
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78. Our use of the term “communal property” simply means that the western legal system’s
recognition of a title or property right is not specific to an individual but to a defined group of
individuals.  The property rights assigned by those within the group may run the gamut from
systems that assign extensive land rights to individuals over specific parcels (virtually making
the individual the “owner” of the parcel) to systems in which individuals have little or no rights
to a specific land area.  See, e.g., Alejandro Diaz, Interculturalidad y Comunidades: Propiedad
Colectiva y Propiedad Individual [Interculturalism and Communities: Collective Property and
Individual Property], 36 DEBATE AGRARIO 71, 73-79 (2003) (Peru) (discussing the internal
property tenure systems of Peruvian peasants).
79. The emphasis on the importance of a communal right to property as opposed to an
individual right to property here largely assumes that readers understand the social and policy
implications of granting individual titles within indigenous homelands.  See, e.g., U.N. Econ.
& Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Final
Working Paper: Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples and
Minorities: Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (June 11, 2001) (prepared by Erica-Irene A. Daes) [hereinafter
Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land] (noting that individual titles “invariably
weaken the indigenous community, nation or people and usually result in the eventual loss of
most or all of the land”); see also PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 2, at 8.  United States history
also gives a depressing example of the negative consequences of imposing standard, western-
style titles to land on individual members of indigenous tribes.  The Dawes Act of 1887, ch.
119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.), accomplished this.
Allotment resulted in large loss of land and cultural devastation because the property regimes
of disparate tribes were no longer adapted to the tribes’ cultures, environments, and needs.  See
generally Kenneth H. Bobroff,  Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001).    
80. International Labour Organization [ILO], Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force
Sept. 5, 1991) [hereinafter ILO 169].  As of early 2007, eighteen states have ratified ILO 169,
including thirteen states in Latin America and the Caribbean.  International Labour
Organization, ILOLEX: Conventions, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last
visited May 26, 2007).   The Latin American and Caribbean countries include Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.  See id. 
81. ILO 169, supra note 80, arts. 13-19.
82. Increasingly minority groups, such as those of African descent in Latin America, are
beginning to demand communal property and recognition of their unique tenure regimes.  See,
e.g., PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 2, at 47-48; see also infra Part VII. 
a human right to communal property78 — one that can be used as both a
shield and a sword against the state.79
The most explicit expression of the communal right to property can be
found in the International Labour Organization’s Convention 169 on Tribal
and Indigenous Peoples (ILO 169),80 which provides special protections for
the relationship of indigenous groups and the land that such groups live on
or use.81  While the concept of a human right to communal property
sometimes resonates outside of indigenous communities,82 unique,
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83. ILO 169, supra note 80, art. 14 (emphasis added) (“The rights of ownership and
possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be
recognised.”).
84. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Fact Sheet No. 9 (Rev. 1),
The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm (last visited
May 26, 2007).
85. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Sub-Comm. on
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities Res. 1994/45, Annex, art. 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1994/45 (Aug. 26, 1994) [hereinafter Draft U.N. Declaration].
86. Id. art. 26 (emphasis added).
87. Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 60,
art. XVIII.  This article provides:
XX1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the legal recognition of their varied and
specific forms and modalities of their control, ownership, use and enjoyment of
community-based property tenure is most frequently associated with
indigenous groups.  Thus, much of this Article focuses on indigenous land
and land rights since these groups and their advocates comprise much of the
driving force for development of the human right to communal property.
ILO 169 requires participating states to guarantee indigenous peoples “rights
of ownership and possession” of their traditional territories.83  Exactly what
“rights of ownership and possession” entail will be addressed further below.
In addition to ILO 169, several draft international law instruments also
address the right to communal property.  For example, the U.N. Working
Group on Indigenous Populations began drafting a Declaration of the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples in 1985.84  The draft states that indigenous peoples
have the collective and individual right to be free from any act “which has
the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or
resources.”85  Furthermore, the Draft Declaration states that 
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and
use the lands and territories, including the total environment of
the lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and
other resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied or used. This includes the right to the full recognition
of their laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure systems and
institutions for the development and management of resources,
and the right to effective measures by States to prevent any
interference with, alienation of or encroachment upon these
rights.86
Similarly, the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples specifically notes the right of indigenous peoples to legal
recognition of their ownership and property rights in traditional lands.87
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territories and property.
XX2. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition of their property and
ownership rights with respect to lands, territories and resources they have
historically occupied, as well as to the use of those to which they have historically
had access for their traditional activities and livelihood.
XX3. i) Subject to 3.ii), where property and user rights of indigenous peoples arise
from rights existing prior to the creation of those states, the states shall recognize
the titles of indigenous peoples relative thereto as permanent, exclusive,
inalienable, imprescriptible and indefeasible.
XXii) Such titles may only be changed by mutual consent between the state and
respective indigenous peoples when they have full knowledge and appreciation of
the nature or attributes of such property.
XXiii) Nothing in 3.i) shall be construed as limiting the right of indigenous
peoples to attribute ownership within the community in accordance with their
customs, traditions, uses and traditional practices, nor shall it affect any collective
community rights over them.
Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
88. Adamantia Pollis, A New Universalism, in HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW PERSPECTIVES, NEW
REALITIES 9, 9 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 2000).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 9-10.
91. See infra Part IV.B.
92. PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 2, at 13.
93. Id.; cf. RAFAEL COLINA GAREA, LA FUNCIÓN SOCIAL DE LA PROPIEDAD PRIVADA EN LA
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE 1978 [THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN THE
SPANISH CONSTITUTION OF 1978] 21-29 (Jose Maria Bosch ed., 1997) (describing the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century movement of law and civil codes toward an understanding
of the individual as the focus of law).
Since the fall of the communist Soviet Union, the debate in human rights
circles between civil/political (i.e., first-generation rights) versus
economic/social rights (i.e., second-generation rights) has lost some of its
importance.88  Most human rights scholars now largely accept the
interdependence of civil/political and economic/social rights.89  The most
challenging human rights problems now deal with tensions between
individual versus minority or communal rights as well the third-generation
rights of self-determination and environmental rights.90  As the jurisprudence
discussed below suggests, both challenges are clearly presented by the
emerging international right to communal property.
IV. Jurisprudence on the International Right to Communal Property
Many of Latin America’s indigenous tribes lost their land during colonial
times.  Some land dispossessions occurred by application of the terra nullius
doctrine,91 while others were lost with adoption of new civil codes after
1850.92  The civil codes only recognized private, individualized holdings.93
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94. PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 2, at 13.
95. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1(d), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1153 (noting that domestic judicial decisions form a “subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law”); Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. V. Belize, Case
12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 168 (2004);
cf. Thomas T. Ankersen, Shared Knowledge, Shared Jurisprudence: Learning to Speak
Environmental Law Creole (Criollo), 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 807, 809, 822 n.86, 826-29 (2003).
96. See, e.g., Alexkor Ltd. v Richtersveld Cmty. & Others 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) at
1329 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.constitutionallaw.co.za/alert/cases/alexkor.pdf.
97. Ankersen, supra note 95, at 808-09. 
98.  Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829) (Story, J.) (“The common law
of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America.  Our ancestors brought with
them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and
adopted only that portion which was applicable to their own situation.”). 
99. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C.).  
While presumably indigenous peoples with a claim to land could have taken
advantage of such individualized titles, few did.94
In this part we first examine a few select domestic law cases; each case
recognized some level of indigenous rights, but the cases vary dramatically
on how closely circumscribed was the right.  The Canadian and Australian
cases particularly merit close attention since both have been extensively
cited in international cases.  We then proceed to the international level
where we examine a doctrine of international law that was frequently
applied by European nations to dispossess indigenous peoples of their land.
We then look specifically at cases in the Inter-American human rights
system that lead up to pronouncement of a human right to communal
property.
A. Domestic Precursors to an International Human Right to Communal
Property
International law often looks to jurisprudential trends in domestic legal
cases,95 even as the domestic cases also frequently look toward analogous
cases in other jurisdictions.96  While this may be accepted in commonwealth
countries with a history of looking to precedents in other commonwealth
countries, it represents something very new for civil law countries.97  The
United States has tended to give little weight to any foreign jurisprudence
other than that directly giving birth to independent U.S. common law.98
Furthermore, philosophical hostility to the concept of communal property
runs deep in the United States.  This hostility led to the partitioning and
allotment to individuals of the land of Native Americans through the Dawes
Act of 1887.99  Supporters of allotment claimed that communal land holds
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100.  Bobroff, supra note 79, at 1564 (citing LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE OF FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN
43 (Phila., Lake Mohonk Conference 1885)).
101. Id. at 1566 (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, H.R. DOC. NO.
25-219, at 454-55 (1839)).
102. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
103. Id. at 553-55, 571-72.
104. Id. at 560.
105. Id. at 561-62.
106. Id. at 576-77, 587.  The Court also, however, largely justified the dispossession of
Indians and the right of whites to the land by a theory of conquest.  Id. at 588-91.
107. Id. at 573.
108. Id. at 579-80.
Native Americans back because such land systems lack “selfishness, which
is at the bottom of civilization.”100  Supporters of allotment also claimed that
“[c]ommon property and civilization cannot co-exist. . . . At the foundation
of the whole social system lies individuality of property.”101
Below we briefly consider a few examples of early domestic cases, from
the United States as well as other nations, that helped dispossess indigenous
peoples of their lands before considering cases that began the move toward
acknowledging that indigenous peoples have a collective right to their
homeland.
1. Johnson v. M’Intosh
Decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1823, Johnson v. M’Intosh102
revolved around a dispute where the plaintiffs claimed ownership of a
property based on a sale of the land from Native Americans to a private
party.103  The defendant, M’Intosh, claimed ownership based on a land grant
from the U.S. government.104  None of the purchasers ever had possession
of the land, but they did seek acknowledgment and confirmation of their
titles by the U.S. government at various times from 1781 until 1816.105
Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the principle that property claims in the
New World were rooted in the discovery doctrine.106  When European
Christians discovered a territory, “that discovery gave title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made against
all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.”107  The Court also declared the principle that lands held by
Christians by virtue of their discovery could be granted to individuals by the
government that held title, regardless of whether or not Native Americans
lived on the granted land.108  Furthermore, recognition of a right of Native
Americans to alienate lands already claimed by the discovery doctrine would
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109. Id. at 587-88.  This argument does not address the fact that the discovery doctrine in
theory requires empty territory to apply.  See, e.g. infra Section IV.B., especially notes 186-89
and accompanying text (discussing inapplicability of the doctrine of discovery as a basis for
exercising sovereignty over territory inhabited by indigenous peoples).
110. Id. at 585, 592.
111. Id. at 604-05.  The district court opinion affirmed that a “title to lands, under grants to
private individuals, made by Indian tribes or nations . . . cannot be recognised in the Courts of
the United States.”  Id. at 562.
112. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
113. Id. at 273.
114. Id. at 285, 288-90.
115. See Alvarez v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 458, 478 (1907) (noting that when the United
States appropriated sovereignty of Puerto Rico from Spain through war, the “cession or
conquest of territory does not affect the rights of private property”), aff'd, 216 U.S. 167 (1910);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 209 cmt.
a (1987) (distinguishing between public and private property in state succession, noting that a
change in sovereignty does not usually affect the private property of individuals).  See generally
L. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Instituion: The Separation of Property from
contradict the discovery doctrine because discovery vests absolute title in
the discoverer. 109
The Court essentially declared that once Native American lands were
“discovered,” the Native Americans lost both their sovereignty as well as
their right to convey property in their possession.  Subsequently, Native
Americans could only convey the property if they conveyed it to the state.110
Thus, the Court concluded that “native title” did not allow for a transfer of
property interest that could withstand a competing land grant from the U.S.
government.111
2. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States  
More than a century later, in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,112 the
U.S. Supreme Court relied in large part on its decision in M’Intosh.  In Tee-
Hit-Ton, the Tee-Hit-Ton clan claimed a taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment as a result of the U.S. government granting a timber concession
to a third party on land claimed and occupied by the Tee-Hit-Ton.113  The
Court rejected this claim and said that the occupancy right of Indians, which
the government has the power to unilaterally extinguish, does not give rise
to a sufficient property interest to support a takings claim.114
United States case law indicates that the Supreme Court ratified the view
of early colonists and settlers that the Indians did not even qualify for the
protections of private property that most individuals qualify for under
accepted standards of international law.  International law posits that a
change in sovereignty over land does not alter private ownership of the
land.115  Yet M’Intosh and its progeny repeatedly indicate that when the
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Sovereignty in International Law, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 263, 266-70 (1997). 
116. See infra text accompanying notes 152-59.
117. Placido Gomez, The History and Adjudication of the Common Lands of Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1039 (1985).
118. For example, in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), the U.S.
Supreme Court confronted the question of whether an Indian tribe could revive its sovereignty
claim over land that it had purchased since the land composed part of the reservation that had
been sold in violation of the law generations before.  The Court said, 
[W]e decline to project redress for the Tribe into the present and future, thereby
disrupting the governance of central New York’s counties and towns.  Generations
have passed during which non-Indians have owned and developed the area that
once composed the Tribe’s historic reservation.  And at least since the middle
years of the 19th century, most of the Oneidas have resided elsewhere.  Given the
longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its inhabitants, the
regulatory authority constantly exercised by New York State and its counties and
towns, and the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking judicial relief against parties other
than the United States, we hold that the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient
sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue.
Id. at 202-03.
119. See, e.g., Inbal Sansani, American Indian Land Rights in the Inter-American System:
Dann v. United States, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2003, at 2, 2-5, available at http://www.wcl.
american.edu/hrbrief/10/2indian.cfm
(noting that the United States rejected the Inter-American Commission’s preliminary report in
its entirety, confiscated cattle of the Danns in 2002, and auctioned them off despite a request
by the Commission to return the cattle to the Danns). 
120. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).
Indians lost their right to sovereignty due to discovery or conquest, the
Indians simultaneously lost the equivalent of their private rights to their
land.  This represents confusion on the part of U.S. courts regarding what the
Australian Supreme Court in the Mabo case would later define as the radical
versus the beneficial title of property.116  The confusion of jurisdiction and
ownership in the United States has been well captured in Placido Gomez’s
The History and Adjudication of the Common Lands of Spanish and Mexican
Land Grants, which details this problem in lands ceded by Mexico to the
United States by the Treaty of Hidalgo.117
Subsequent case law in the United States has done little to soften the hard
edges of M’Intosh and Tee-Hit-Ton,118 and the United States has largely
ignored international effort to encourage recognition of communal property
rights in the United States.119
3. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (Canada)
In this case before the Supreme Court of Canada, two indigenous chiefs,
on behalf of their respective peoples, sued the province of British Columbia
for recognition of their  tribes’ claims to land in British Columbia.120  The
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121. Id. at 1080-82.  Sui generis is from Latin and means “[o]f its own kin or class; unique
or peculiar.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999).
122. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1081, 1090.
123. Id. at 1082-83.
124. Id. at 1081-82, 1088-91.
125. Id. at 1091.
126. Id. at 1088.
127. Id. at 1080.
128. Id. at 1080-81.
129. Id. at 1081.
130. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
131. Id. at 180 (Toohey, J.).  The decision noted that municipal courts did not have the
authority to determine whether title to the land in question had been acquired by the Crown, but
on the effect of the Crown’s acquisition of title.  Id. at 31-32 (Brennan, J.).  
court stated that aboriginal title was sui generis,121 inalienable to anyone
other than the government,122 inherently communal, and thereby incapable
of being held by an individual.123  
The court in Delgamuukw also indicated that aboriginal title includes
restrictions on usage of the land.124  While the court stated that it sought to
avoid placing a “straitjacket” on indigenous peoples,125 it forbade indigenous
peoples from using aboriginal title lands in a form “irreconcilable” with the
special relationship of the people to the land that justifies such a title.126  
The limitations on indigenous rights to their land in Delgamuukw are not
as severe as those in Johnson v. M’Intosh and Tee-Hit-Ton.  For instance,
Delgamuukw stated that aboriginal title entails more than mere rights to
exclusive use and occupation of land to engage in activities that are
themselves rights of indigenous peoples.127  However, the court in
Delgamuukw then noted that the right remains something less than absolute
fee simple ownership of the land.128  The court concluded that aboriginal title
to land can only be understood by reference to “western” and indigenous
conceptions of land.129
4. Mabo v. Queensland (Australia) — Domestic Law Leading the Way
for International Law
Mabo v. Queensland represents the leading domestic law case on
communal property rights in the common law system.130  The case involved
issues of international law — for example, whether the legal theory of terra
nullius applied — as well as common law principles and colonial
constitutional law.131  The case is crucial to understanding the progressive
nature of the development of the international human right to property
because the Mabo decision reevaluated the common law treatment of
indigenous people’s land rights.  In doing so, Mabo blazed a new path for
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132. Id. at 30 (Brennan, J.).
133. See id. at 16-17; id. at 120-21 (Dawson, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 18 (Brennan, J.).
135. Id. at 20.
136. Id. at 22, 61.
137. Id. at 121 (Dawson, J., dissenting); id. at 176 (Toohey, J.). 
138. Id. at 30 (Brennan, J.).
139. Id. at 32.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 36-40.
future international case law.  In part, it accomplished this by recognizing
the need for the law to evolve to a point where the common law does not
“offend[] the values of justice and human rights (especially equality before
the law) which are aspirations of the contemporary Australian legal
system.”132   
Eddie Mabo was a member of the Meriam people on the Murray Islands,
off the northeast coast of Australia.133  The Meriam people had only sporadic
contact with Europeans beginning in the early nineteenth century.134  Few
Europeans lived on or visited the islands before they were annexed to
Queensland in 1879.135  The Meriam were left in possession of much of their
land after the annexation.136  Mabo and his co-plaintiffs claimed a right to
protection of their property and usufruct rights based on native title.137
While the plaintiffs did not question Australia’s exercise of sovereignty over
the Murray Islands, they questioned whether this meant that the Meriam
people lost all rights to their property.138
First, the Mabo court examined the doctrine of terra nullius.  During the
rise of colonialism, colonial powers struggled with the legal justifications
for claiming sovereignty over land where indigenous or tribal peoples
already lived.  International law at the time already recognized the legal
theory of terra nullius: this theory provided that unoccupied land could be
claimed by the first country to claim and occupy it.139  Of course since
Europeans were the ones making the law at this time, “countries” meant the
recognized states of Europe.140
Early European colonialists expanded the concept of terra nullius to
include not only unoccupied land — understood literally as land where no
one lived — but also land occupied by those peoples who did not have
formalized, individual property systems similar to those of the colonizers or
by peoples who did not practice similar types of settled agriculture as the
colonizers, or who, for any other reason, were considered “barbarous.”141
The first two of these reasons for the expanded notion of “terra nullius”
apparently grew from John Locke’s labor theory of property: a people who
did not mix its labor with the land in a form of agriculture recognizable to
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142. See LOCKE, supra note 53, at 25-34; see also Bruce Kercher, Native Title in the
Shadows: The Origins of the Myth of Terra Nullius in Early New South Wales Courts, in
COLONIALISM AND THE MODERN WORLD: SELECTED STUDIES 100, 104, 118 nn.21-22 (Gregory
Blue et al. eds., 2002) (noting that Vattel’s Law of Nations said that people were obliged to
cultivate the soil and that nomadic, tribal people could not be thought of as in possession of land
and had no right to complain if more industrious peoples appropriated the land for greater
production).
143. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 39 (Brennan, J.); id. at 83-84 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.); Matthew
C. Miller, An Australian Nunavut?  A Comparison of Inuit and Aboriginal Rights Movements
in Canada and Australia, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1175, 1191 n.101, 1192 (1998).  
144. Ann McGrath, A National Story, in CONTESTED GROUND: AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES
UNDER THE BRITISH CROWN 1, 12-13 (Ann McGrath ed., 1995).
145. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 30 (Brennan, J.).  
146. Id. at 31.
147. Id. at 33-34.  The court said that the common law of England applied to the land at issue
even though the court rejected the theory of terra nullius.  Id. at 37-38.
148. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31 (Oct. 16).  For discussion
of this advisory opinion, see infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
149. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 43 (Brennan, J.).
150. Id.
the colonizers does not have real “ownership” of the land.142  Thus, the
Australian aborigines did not have ownership of the land because the
aborigines were not “civilized,”143 nor did they practice European-style
sedentary agriculture.144  
Because sovereignty claims were never questioned, the court did not need
to consider the implications of rejection of the expanded notion of terra
nullius on Australia’s exercise of sovereignty over the Murray Islands.145  In
fact, the court expressly noted that it lacked authority to issue a judgment on
the validity or invalidity of claims of Australian sovereignty.146  The court
merely considered the theory of terra nullius as a precursor to determining
the effect of the common law in the case.147  
Even though international law provided persuasive precedent for rejecting
the notion that the aborigines and their legal system should be ignored,148 the
court held that its ability to modify the common law did not extend to
altering fundamental principles of property embedded in the common law.149
To ensure proper decision of the case without doing violence to the
“skeletal” structure of property in the common law,150 the court launched
into a complex and detailed historical analysis of the history of property in
the common law.  This analysis led the court to distinguish between the
common law’s recognition of two distinct types of “ownership” of land by
a sovereign: the right of the sovereign to exercise legal jurisdiction over the
land and the right of the sovereign to claim “ownership” as commonly
understood in the sense that any natural or juridical person can own
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151. Id. at 43-46; id. at 82 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.).  The court assumed that the first type of
“ownership” was valid, a point that was not challenged in the Mabo case.  See supra text
accompanying notes 145-46.  The second type of “ownership” is that protected by the first-
generation right to property.
152. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 48 (Brennan, J.).
153. Id. at 43-46.
154. Id. at 26.
155. Id. at 29.
156. Id. at 48-49.
157. Id. at 51.
158. Id. at 48.
159. Id. at 48, 52.
property.151  The court identified the former type of ownership as “radical”
title.152  If a sovereign holds radical title and ownership as commonly
understood (i.e., beneficial title), then the sovereign has absolute title.
However, the court also noted that an individual’s ownership of land does
not necessarily end simply because of a change of the sovereign that holds
radical title — or jurisdiction over the land.153    
In Mabo, the state claimed that the Crown’s exercise of sovereignty over
the land in question had given it all of the possible property rights available
over the land in question — both radical and beneficial title — and that, as
a result, no one could hold any rights to that land without an express grant
of such rights from the Crown.154  The court, however, asked whether the
common law at the time of the Crown’s exercise of sovereignty over the land
at issue in Mabo recognized an ownership interest of the aborigines in the
case.155  If so, how did this affect the rights of the Crown to the land?
After lengthy inquiry into the history of the common law, the court
concluded that, while the concept of “radical” title to the land is essential to
the common law structure and cannot be disrupted, a recognition of
indigenous land rights based on occupation predating the Crown’s assertion
of sovereignty is not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
property in the common law.156  The assumption that had prevented
recognition of indigenous land rights after a declaration of sovereignty was
the confusion between the fiction of “radical” title, belonging to the
sovereign by virtue of the sovereign’s right to apply its laws over the
territory, and the beneficial title, which belongs to the property owner who
may or may not be the sovereign.157  If the sovereign holds both the radical
title and the beneficial title, then the sovereign is said to hold absolute
title.158  However, if the beneficial title is held by another party independent
of a grant from the sovereign, then the sovereign only holds radical title,
subject to the rights of the beneficial title holder.159
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160. Id. at 56 (quoting Amodu Tijani v. Sec’y, S. Provinces, [1921] 3 N.L.R. 21 (S.C.)
(Nig.).  In reality, this statement alone did not result in the finding that the land rights of the
Meriam people had survived.  This statement merely recognized that the rights could have
survived.  The Mabo court subsequently considered whether the land customs of the Meriam
people were compatible with the common law and whether the Meriam had maintained
exclusive possession of the claimed land, id. at 59-61; whether a sufficiently coherent tenure
system existed among the Meriam to allow for ascertainment of the rights that native title grants
the Meriam, id. at 61; and whether or not the native title of the Meriam people had been
extinguished by Australia, id. at 63-69.
161. Id. at 84 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.).
162. See, e.g., id. at 40-42, 58 (Brennan, J.).
163. Id. at 41-43.
164. Id. at 87-88 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.).
165. Id. at 88.
166. Id. at 88-89.
167. Id. at 64 (Brennan, J.); id. at 111 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.).  But see id. at 89-94
(examining the tension and ambiguity between the possibility of extinguishment at the will of
the sovereign and the possibly illusory nature of the title).  The possibility of the state
extinguishing native title through inconsistent legislation resulted from the historical analysis
of the common law and the observation that the common law had held that an occupying or
conquering sovereign does not automatically extinguish the laws that existed before conquest
or occupation, but that conquest or occupation gave the new sovereign the inherent right to alter
the laws.  While all the justices in the opinion agreed on this point, they disagreed as to whether
Once the court removed the legal impediment to possible recognition of
aboriginal rights in land, it assessed the weight of common law authority to
determine if the land rights of Mabo and the Murray Islanders had survived.
The court ruled that the land rights of the Meriam could endure because
“mere change in sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to disturb rights
of private owners.”160  Importantly for this analysis, the Mabo court also
explicitly rejected the notion that the common law was restricted to
recognition of individual property rights and could not recognize communal
property rights.161 
Underlying much of the court’s reasoning was a concern with racism.162
The court observed that any attempt to simply ignore the traditional customs
of aborigines in their land tenure could only be founded on inherently racist
justifications repugnant to modern sensibilities.163  Thus, the court concluded
that the common law had in the past and could now recognize the land rights
of aboriginal people with what the court called “common law native title.”164
The attributes of common law native title are primarily determined by the
traditional tenure practices of the natives in question.165  This conclusion
resulted in the recognition of communal aspects of title and the inalienability
of the title to anyone but the state.166  Finally, the court also concluded that
the state may extinguish native title by passing legislation inconsistent with
the native title.167
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such a change in law extinguishing common law native title would give rise to a compensable
taking of land.  See, e.g., id. at 112 (suggesting that legislative reforms allow for the
compensation of native titleholders); id. at 126 (Dawson, J., dissenting) (“There is . . . no
general proposition to be found, either in law or in history, that the Crown is legally bound to
pay compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land . . . .”); id. at 216 (Toohey, J.) (“The
traditional title of the Meriam people . . . may not be extinguished without the payment of
compensation or damages to the traditional titleholders of the Islands.”).
168. Legal Status of E. Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5).
169. Id. at 6.
170. See id. at 13-17.  Prior to separation, Norway and Denmark had been united under the
same crown since 1380.  Id. at 9.
171. Id. at 22, 26.
172. Id. at 25.
173. See id. at 50-51, 55.
Mabo remains a watershed case as it held that exercise of sovereignty and
subsequent application of the common law did not automatically extinguish
aboriginal land rights in Australia.  The case also further diminished terra
nullius as a justification for the colonial exercise of sovereignty over
indigenous people.  Despite these advances, Mabo still allows a sovereign
to unilaterally extinguish the property rights of indigenous people.  Now that
change was in the air, however, the power to extinguish seemed destined for
change as well, at least as a matter of international human rights law.
B. Terra Nullius in International Law
One with little background in property law could be excused for wondering
why Mabo should be such a watershed case.  After all, Mabo was only an
Australian case, not an international law case; surely the international system
had long since abandoned the concept of terra nullius.  In fact, terra nullius had
been treated as the unquestioned rule of law through most of the twentieth
century.   In the 1933 case of Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,168 Denmark
asked the Permanent Court of International Justice to determine the validity of
a Norwegian declaration of sovereignty over part of the eastern portion of
Greenland.169  Both Denmark and Norway had been dancing around the delicate
issue of the legal status of eastern Greenland since 1814, when Norway and
Denmark separated.170  While Denmark clearly had engaged in sufficient activity
and settlement in much of western Greenland to claim sovereignty, Norway
contended that eastern Greenland was still terra nullius.171  In 1931, even as the
conflict between Norway and Denmark over eastern Greenland was heating up,
Norway claimed sovereignty over part of eastern Greenland due to occupation
by Norwegians.172  The court ultimately concluded that Denmark indeed had
sovereignty over the entire island of Greenland.173
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174. See, e.g., id. at 10, 14, 19, 21, 29.
175. Cf. id. at 28.  
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 29 (noting that it does not qualify as “conquest” if aboriginals massacre a
settlement since “conquest” only applies to a conflict between two “States”).
179. See, e.g., Obiora Chinedu Okafor, After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State
Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in Africa, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 516-
17 (2000).
180. Legal Status of E. Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. at 27.
181. FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, De Indis et De ivre belli Relectiones [“Of Indians” and “Of
the Law in Time of War” Lectures], in RELECTIONES THEOLOGICAE XII (Johann Georgii ed.,
1696), reprinted and translated in 6 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-28 (Ernest Nys
& James Brown Scott eds., John Pawley Bate trans., 1917) (denying that the Indians in the New
World lost their lands due to their sins or infirmity of mind); id. at 129-49 (criticizing the
supposed rights of the Spaniards that gave them title to Indian lands in the New World); see
also, e.g., Bobroff, supra note 49, at 641, 649-50, translated at http://lawschool.unm.edu/
faculty/bobroff/publications.php (follow “English Version” hyperlink; then view pp. 10-11).
Franciscus de Victoria’s magnanimity towards the Indians in the New World did, however, have
The struggle over which Europeans would exercise sovereignty over
Greenland occurred, however, without ever considering Greenland’s indigenous
inhabitants — the Inuit.  While the decision mentions the existence of
indigenous peoples living on Greenland,174 it does not consider whether they
have any sort of claim to the land.175  In fact, after noting that most sovereignty
questions involve two competing “Powers,” the decision notes that “[o]ne of the
peculiar features of the present case is that up to 1931 there was no claim by any
Power other than Denmark to the sovereignty over Greenland.  Indeed, up till
1921, no Power disputed the Danish claim to sovereignty.”176  The meaning of
“Power” becomes clear in the following paragraph in which the court states that
“the tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise
of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not make out a superior
claim.”177  Thus, the court only appears to consider the interests of “Powers”
conceived of as “States” within the definition of western legal thought.  The
court even seems to indicate that aboriginals do not have the same rights or
ability to establish sovereignty by the means that “States” do.178  Such legal
reasoning lends support to those that claim that international law has inherent
biases because of its Eurocentric roots.179  Thus, even though “[t]he Danish
claim is not founded upon any particular act of occupation,”180 the Danish had
more “rights” to Greenland than even the aboriginals who had lived there for
thousands of years.
All this is not to say that application of terra nullius to dispossess indigenous
people enjoyed universal support.  The early international legal scholar de
Victoria questioned its use,181 as did Blackstone in his Commentaries on the
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very strict limits.  Thus, Victoria asserted that the Indians had: no right to refuse Spaniards the
right to travel in the lands of the Indians, VICTORIA, supra, at 151-52; no right to prevent
Spaniards from trading among the Indians, id. at 152-53; no right to prevent Spaniards in
sharing whatever the Indians shared among themselves, id. at 153; and no right to prevent
Spaniards from preaching Christianity in the lands of the Indians, id. at 156.
182. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *7 (“[S]o long as [colonization] was
confined to the stocking and cultivation of desart [sic] uninhabited countries, it kept strictly
within the limits of the law of nature.  But how far the seising on countries already peopled, and
driving out or massacring [sic] the innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they
differed from their invaders in language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour;
how far such a conduct was consonant to nature, to reason, or to christianity, deserved well to
be considered by those, who have rendered their names immortal by thus civilizing mankind.”).
183. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39 (Oct. 16).
184. Id. at 37.
185. Id. at 38-39.
186. Id. at 39.
187. Id. 
188. Id.
189. Cf. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 40-42, 181-82 (Austl.) (Brennan, J.).
The Mabo court quoted a separate opinion added to the Western Sahara proceedings by the
Law.182  Still, terra nullius remained an integral part of international law until
1975.  In that year, the International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion,
rejected the application of the terra nullius doctrine as the basis for exercising
sovereignty over indigenous peoples.183  
The advisory opinion arose out of a dispute primarily between Morocco and
Spain.  The International Court of Justice found it had jurisdiction to answer the
following question: “Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at
the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra
nullius)?”184  The Court noted that it had to decide the case based on the law in
effect at the time of Spain’s colonization.185  Evidence during general
colonization of the period led the Court to conclude that, despite disagreements
among jurists, state practice at the time indicated that “sovereignty was not
generally considered as effected unilaterally through ‘occupation’ of terra
nullius by original title but through agreements concluded with local rulers.”186
Thus, said the Court, because Western Sahara was inhabited by “peoples which,
if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs
competent to represent them,”187 and Spain had entered into agreements with the
chiefs of local tribes and relied upon these agreements in royal decrees and
international negotiations, Spain could not reasonably assert that its claim of
sovereignty was based on terra nullius.188  The Mabo court cited this advisory
opinion in its own opinion for the proposition that international law required that
an area be actually uninhabited before the doctrine of terra nullius could form
the basis for an assertion of sovereignty through mere occupation.189 
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Vice-President of the Court, Judge Fouad Ammoun.  Id. at 41 (quoting Western Sahara, 1975
I.C.J. at 85-86).  In that opinion, Judge Ammoun had stated:
[T]he concept of terra nullius, employed at all periods, to the brink of the
twentieth century, to justify conquest and colonization, stands condemned.  It is
well known that in the sixteenth century, Francisco de Vittoria protested against
the application to the American Indians, in order to deprive them of their lands,
of the concept of res nullius. 
XXThis approach . . . , which was adopted . . . in the nineteenth century, was
hardly echoed at all at the Berlin Conference of 1885.  It is however the concept
which should be adopted today. 
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 86-87.
190. The term “indigenous peoples” has come to be recognized as a unique classification
within international law during the past decades.  Marcus Colchester et al., Indigenous Land
Tenure: Challenges and Possibilities, LAND REFORM, LAND SETTLEMENT & COOPERATIVES,
2004/1, at 9, 9, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5407t/y5407t00.pdf.  An exact
definition of “indigenous peoples” has, however, proved difficult to formulate.  The ILO 169
defines “tribal peoples” as those 
in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status
is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special
laws or regulations; 
XX(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or
colonisation or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective
of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions. 
ILO 169, supra note 80, art. 1, para. 1.
The abandonment of terra nullius as the legal basis for the dispossession of
indigenous lands set the stage for increased recognition of the rights of
indigenous peoples to their lands as a matter of international law.
C. Jurisprudence in the Inter-American System
The developing doctrine of aboriginal title has served as the jurisprudential
foundation for a series of seminal cases in the Inter-American system that
forcefully develop a human right to communal property — at least for
indigenous peoples.190  Before examining these cases, we briefly describe the
Inter-American human rights system.  
1. The Inter-American Human Rights System
The Inter-American human rights system has developed within the context
of the Organization of American States (OAS).  The OAS was not founded until
1948, but concern about indigenous peoples in the western hemisphere had
already given rise to conferences and congresses about indigenous peoples as
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191. SHELTON H. DAVIS, LAND RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, at iii (1988).
192. Id. at 7-8. 
193. See, e.g., infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the Yanomami case).
194. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 65, art. 44.
195. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art. 23 (Dec.
4, 2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento.cfm?&CFID=239923&CFTOKEN=
47883149; Pedro Nikken, Observaciones sobre el fortalecimiento del sistema Interamericano
de derechos humanos en vísperas de la Asamblea General de la OEA [Observations on the
Strengthening of the Inter-American System of Human Rights on the Eve of the General
Assembly of the OAS], 30-31 REVISTA IIDH 13 (2001) (Costa Rica) (outlining the changes to
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights procedural changes adopted over the years until,
effective in 2001, victims of human rights abuses are allowed to appear directly before the court
as complainants).
196. JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6, 19 (2003); see also American Convention on Human Rights, supra note
65, art. 61.
197. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 196, at 6-7, 19.
198. Id.
early as 1933.191  Such concern did not express itself institutionally within the
OAS until the 1970s when, spurred by land invasions by non-indigenous settlers
into indigenous territories and resulting violence as well as other forms of
discrimination against indigenous peoples, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) (founded in 1959) began making formal proclamations
on human rights violations against indigenous peoples.192  By the 1980s, many
indigenous groups and activists had mobilized to defend the property of
indigenous peoples as necessary to their survival.193  
The Inter-American human rights system has in part emerged as a leader in
establishing the human right to property because the system, based on the
Charter of the Organization of American States and the American Convention
on Human Rights, allows individuals to bring international law cases.194
Allowing individuals access to international fora by application of public
international law is a comparatively recent development,195 which has not, as of
yet, been adopted by all other international tribunals.
Procedurally the Inter-American human rights system has another unusual
aspect.  Complainants do not have direct access to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.  Complaints are first lodged with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.196  If the Commission does not feel that the case
has been resolved in a reasonable time after issuance of the Commission’s
report, then the Commission may recommend the case to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights.197  The Court then retains discretion to accept or reject
the case.198  The cases below represent both reports of the Commission and
adjudications of the court.
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199. Coulter v. Brazil (Yanomami), Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/85,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/84.85
eng/Brazil7615.htm.
200. Id. ¶ 1 (Background).
201. Id. ¶ 2(a) (Background).
202. See id. ¶ 2(f)-(g) (Background).
203. Id. ¶ 1 (Background).
204. Id. ¶ 2 (Considering).
205. Id. ¶ 11 (Considering).
206. Id. ¶ 1 (Resolves).
207. Id. ¶ 3(b) (Resolves).
2. The Yanomami Case (Brazil)199
Several nongovernmental organizations and others filed a petition before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1980 against the government
of Brazil, alleging violations of the human rights of the Yanomami Indians.200
The Yanomami inhabit the Brazilian state of Amazonas and the Territory of
Roraima, on the border with Venezuela.201  Road building and discovery of
mineral deposits brought non-Yanomami into Yanomami territories.202  Alleged
violations of human rights included threats to the Yanomami’s right to life,
liberty, and personal security; right to equality before the law; right to religious
freedom and worship; right to the preservation of health and well being; right to
education; right to recognition of juridical personality and of civil rights; and
right to property.203
The alleged violations stemmed from actions and incidents including
construction of a road through Yanomami territory that displaced the
Yanomami; failure to effectively secure a legislatively-mandated Yanomami
Park to protect the cultural heritage of the Yanomami; granting authorization for
exploitation of subsurface minerals in Yanomami territory; permitting outsiders
to invade Yanomami territory, thus bringing in contagious diseases; and
displacing the Yanomami from their ancestral lands.204
After reviewing the evidence, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights found that Brazil had failed to protect the human rights of the
Yanomami.205  Specifically, the Commission found that the Yanomami’s rights
to life, liberty, personal security, residence and movement, and preservation of
health and well-being had all been violated.206  The Commission did not
explicitly find a violation of the right to property.  Even so, the case still
represented an important step because the Commission recommended that Brazil
protect the land of the Yanomami by establishing and demarcating its
boundaries as part of the solution to human rights violations.207 
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208. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79
_ing.pdf.  For articles on this case, see S. James Anaya, The Awas Tingni Petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights: Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and Government Neglect
in Nicaragua, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 157 (1996);  S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The
Case of the Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous
Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2002).
209. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153.
210. Demarcation (sanamiento in Spanish) is the physical process of visibly delineating on
the ground the boundaries of land to which a legal title has been issued.  PLANT & HVALKOF,
supra note 2, at 23; see also Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land, supra note 79,
¶¶ 17-20.
211. See Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 83 (testimony of Jaime
Castillo Felipe, member of the Awas Tingni Community).
212. See id.
213. The Constitutional Court of the Supreme Court of Nicaragua declared the granted
concession invalid for failure to follow proper procedures.  Id. ¶ 17.
214. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6.
215. See id. ¶ 25.  See generally American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 65,
arts. 1-2, 21, 25.
216. Awas Tingni, Case 11.577, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 27/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98,
doc. 35 (1998).
3. The Case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua208
In the case known popularly as Awas Tingni, the indigenous right to
communal property was squarely presented.  The Inter-American Court for
Human Rights ruled that the government of Nicaragua had violated the right to
property of the Awas Tingni, an indigenous group on the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua.209  The case arose because the Awas Tingni community had for many
years been attempting to secure titling and demarcation210 of land they claimed
under constitutional and other legal protections for indigenous land in
Nicaraguan law.211  Not only were the Awas Tingni frustrated in this attempt, but
during the process, the state granted a logging concession on land claimed by the
Awas Tingni without consulting the Awas Tingni.212  Although the Awas Tingni
continued to fight this concession in the legal system of Nicaragua,213 they also
filed a complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.214  The
Commission concluded that Nicaragua had violated articles 1 (Obligation to
Respect Rights), 2 (Domestic Legal Effects), 21 (Right to Property), and 25
(Right to Judicial Protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights.215
The Commission recommended that Nicaragua invalidate and renounce the
logging concession on disputed lands as well as take immediate action to
identify, title, and demarcate the traditional lands of the Awas Tingni.216  The
Commission then gave Nicaragua two months to report on the recommendations
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217. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 25. 
218. Id. ¶ 1.
219. Id. ¶¶ 115-22.
220. Id. ¶¶ 114, 123-27.
221. Ley No. 445, 13 Dec. 2002, Ley del Régimen de Propiedad Comunal de los Pueblos
Indígenas y Comunidades Étnicas de las Regiones Autónomas de la Costa Atlántica de
Nicaragua y de los Ríos Bocay, Coco, Indio y Maíz [Communal Property Law of the Native
Towns and Ethnic Communities of the Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua
and of the Bocay, Coco, Indio, and Maíz Rivers], La Gaceta [L.G.], 23 Jan. 2003 (Nicar.),
available at http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/d0c69e2c91d9955906256a4000
77164a/f59730333b3f6fa5062571b200559533?OpenDocument.
222. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 147-48, 153 (quoting
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 65, art. 29(b)).
223. At the same time, the court might have reached the same conclusion even without
Nicaraguan recognition of the right possessed by the Awas Tingni with regard to their
traditionally occupied lands.  The court emphasized that “[t]he terms of an international human
rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, for which reason they cannot be made equivalent
to the meaning given to them in domestic law.”  Id. ¶ 146.  This may have allowed the court to
interpret the property protections in the Convention to protect the Awas Tingni regardless of
Nicaraguan law.
made by the Commission.217  Three months later the Commission transferred the
case to the contentious jurisdiction of the court in San José, Costa Rica for an
adversarial hearing on the matter.218
The court noted that Nicaraguan law contained protections of the right to
communal property of indigenous groups such as the Awas Tingni over their
traditionally occupied land.219  The court, however, also declared that
constitutional provisions and laws guaranteeing protection of this right did not
satisfy the obligations of Nicaragua as a signatory to the American Convention
on Human Rights because Nicaragua did not have effective processes in place
to protect the rights that domestic law supposedly granted.220  
It is unclear in the opinion whether the court would have ruled that Nicaragua
had violated the right to property of the Awas Tingni had Nicaragua not had
domestic legislation mandating protection of the communal ownership and land
rights of indigenous peoples.221  The opinion emphasized that article 29(b) of the
American Convention on Human Rights forbids interpreting part of the
Convention as “restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom
recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party.”222  Thus, since Nicaraguan
law protected the right to the traditionally occupied communal territory of the
Awas Tingni, the court was required to interpret the Convention in the Awas
Tingi case to consider the Nicaraguan law as part of the protection of property
in the Convention.223
Equally important in the case was the court’s recognition of rights associated
with the right to property.  The court noted that the ability of indigenous groups
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224. Id. ¶ 149.
225. See, e.g., Ley No. 160, 3 Aug. 1994, Por la cual se crea el Sistema Nacional de Reforma
Agraria y Desarrollo Rural Campesino, se establece un subsidio para la adquisición de tierras,
se reforma el Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria y se dictan otras disposiciones [By
Which the National System of Agrarian Reform and Rural Development Is Created, a Subsidy
for the Acquisition of Lands Is Established, the Colombian Institute of the Agrarian Reform Is
Reformed, and Other Dispositions Are Dictated] ch. XIV, art. 85, Diario Oficial [D.O.], 5 Aug.
1994 (Colom.), available at http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/leyes/L0160_94.htm
(recognizing indigenous property rights); id. art. 87 (subjecting indigenous lands to the social
function “in conformity with the uses, culture, and customs of the land’s inhabitants”)
(translation by authors); Ley No. 24, 12 Jan. 1996, Por la cual se crea la Comarca Kuna de
Madungandi [By Which the Kuna de Madungandi Region Is Created] ch. I, art. 1, G.O., 15 Jan.
1996 (Pan.), available at http://www.asamblea.gob.pa/NORMAS/1990/1996/1996_138_0699.
PDF (creating the indigenous special administrative territory of Comarca Madungandi and
granting a communal title to the land to the Kuna Indians); Decreto Ejecutivo No. 228, 3 Dec.
1998, Por el cual se adopta la Carta Orgánica Administrativa de la Comarca Kuna de
Madungandi [By Which the Administrative Article of Incorporation of the Kuna de
Madungandi Region Is Adopted] art. 28, G.O., 8 Dec. 1998 (Pan.), available at http://www.
asamblea.gob.pa/GACETAS/1990/1998/23687_1998.PDF (explicitly recognizing the customary
and traditional laws of the Kuna in the Madungandi Region as long as they do not conflict with
the laws of Panama or the Panamanian constitution).  See also Ley No. 1715, 18 Oct. 1996, Ley
del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria [Law of the National Service of Agrarian Reform]
tit. I, ch. 1, art. 3 (Bol.), available at http://www.inra.gov.bo/portalv2/Uploads/Normas/ley1
715.pdf (granting communal property rights and stating that “application of agrarian laws and
their regulations should consider the habits and customary law of the affected communities”
(translation by authors)); MANUELA TOMEI & LEE SWEPSTON, INT’L LABOUR ORG., ILO
CONVENTION ON INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES, 1989 (NO. 169): A MANUAL 26-28 (rev. ed.
2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/egalite/itpp/convention/
manual.pdf (noting increased recognition of the customary laws of indigenous groups in
Norway, Mexico, and the Phillipines).
226. Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 164.
227. Id. ¶ 173(7).  Furthermore, while the court found its sentence constituted a form of
reparation, id. ¶ 173(5), the court also mandated that Nicaragua invest $50,000 during the
twelve months after the decision in works to benefit the Awas Tingni community, id. ¶ 167.  
to “preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations” requires
that indigenous peoples enjoy secure possession of their land, because the land
is a “fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and
their economic survival.”224  The general connection of land tenure systems and
indigenous law with cultural survival has meant that recognition of traditional
land tenure systems also often involves broader general recognition of the
customary laws of indigenous populations.225
In light of these conclusions, the Court ordered Nicaragua to “adopt the
legislative, administrative, and any other measures required to create an effective
mechanism for delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the property of
indigenous communities”226 and awarded costs in the amount of $30,000.227   
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss4/1
2006] DEFENDING THE POLYGON 719
228. See Indian Law Resource Center, Nicaragua/Awas Tingni Case, http://www.indianlaw.
org/main/projects/past_projects/nicaragua (last visited May 27, 2007).  The law requiring titling
of lands such as those of the Awas Tingni community is Law 445.  See Ley No. 445, 13 Dec.
2002, Ley del Régimen de Propiedad Comunal de los Pueblos Indígenas y Comunidades Étnicas
de las Regiones Autónomas de la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua y de los Ríos Bocay, Coco,
Indio y Maíz [Communal Property Law of the Native Towns and Ethnic Communities of the
Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua and of the Bocay, Coco, Indio, and
Maíz Rivers], L.G., 23 Jan. 2003 (Nicar.), available at http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/
Normaweb.nsf/d0c69e2c91d9955906256a400077164a/f59730333b3f6fa5062571b2005595
33?OpenDocument. 
229. See, e.g., Awas Tingni vuelve a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Awas
Tingni Returns to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights], BOLETÍN INFORMATIVO: EL CASO
AWAS TINGNI V. NICARAGUA (Univ. of Ariz. Indigenous Peoples Law & Policy Program, Tuscon,
Ariz.), Mar. 2006, http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/advocacy/awastingni/newsletter/
newsletterMar2006.htm.
230. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002
eng/USA.11140.htm.
231. Id. ¶¶ 92, 94.
232. Id. ¶¶ 1-2.  The OAS created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in
1959.  See What Is the IACHR?, www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited May 30, 2007).  Since
then, the power and duties of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have expanded
to allow it to request information from OAS member states and to hear petitions from
individuals concerning violations of the American Declaration and the subsequent American
Convention on Human Rights.  See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.  The American
Convention on Human Rights, which entered into force in 1978, created the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights, see American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 65, arts. 52-
Since this ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the
Nicaraguan legislature adopted a comprehensive law for titling and demarcation
of indigenous lands along Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast and the president of
Nicaragua appointed his personal advisor to supervise implementation of the
Court’s decision.228  Unfortunately, the Nicaraguan state has been slow to
implement the protections ordered by the Inter-American Court in the Awas
Tingni case, resulting in additional human rights violations.229
4. The Dann Case (United States)230
The next case to address the communal right to property came as a result of
a petition by two Shoshone Indian sisters to secure rights to aboriginal property
in the United States.231  The sisters presented a petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights in 1993 and alleged that the U.S. government
violated articles II (right to equality before the law), III (right to religious
freedom and worship), VI (right to a family and protection thereof), XIV (right
to work and fair remuneration), XVIII (right to a fair trial) and XXIII (right to
property) of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.232  The
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65, which only has jurisdiction over states parties to the Convention or states that voluntarily
assent to the Court’s jurisdiction, see id. arts. 61-62.  The United States has not ratified the
American Convention on Human Rights.  Office of Int’l Law, Org. of Am. States, American
Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Sigs/b-32.html (last visited May 30, 2007).  Thus, the Commission may interpret United
States compliance with the American Declaration but not with the American Convention on
Human Rights.  See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
art. 49 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://www. cidh.org/Basicos/basic16.htm.
233. Dann, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, ¶ 2.
234. Id.
235. Id. ¶¶ 82-87, 116.
236. Id. ¶ 45.
237. Id. 
238. Id. ¶ 46.
239. Id.  Article 14 of the ILO Convention (No. 169) provides that:
XX1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the
lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recongnised.  In addition, measures
shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned
to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally
had access for their subsistence and traditional activities.  Particular attention shall
be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect.
XX2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the
peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of
their rights of ownership and possession. 
XX3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system
factual basis for the complaint included threats by the United States to remove
the Danns and their livestock from land the Danns claimed was traditionally-
occupied land of the Shoshone tribe.233  The Danns also complained that the
United States had granted or allowed gold mining activities on ancestral
Shoshone lands.234  The United States responded that any Shoshone land rights
had been extinguished in the late 1800s due to encroachment by nonindigenous
settlers, and that the U.S. government paid the Shoshone just compensation for
the loss of their land.235
The Danns claimed that they and other Shoshone tribe members had a valid
claim to ancestral Shoshone lands “through traditional patterns of use and
occupancy of those lands and its natural resources.”236  This, said the Danns,
constitutes a “customary land tenure system,” and U.S. law purports to recognize
customary land tenure.237  Additionally, regardless of the domestic law of the
United States, the Danns asserted that the right to property in article XXIII of the
American Declaration, coupled with the principle of nondiscrimination,
indicates that such “customary land tenure systems” should receive legal
recognition.238  The Danns cited ILO Convention (No. 169) Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, article 14, as support
for this claim.239  They also cited to article XVIII of the proposed American
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to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.
ILO 169, supra note 80, art. 14.  The United States has not signed or ratified ILO 169, see
ILOLEX: Conventions, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (follow “C169"
hyperlink; then follow “See the ratifications for this Convention” hyperlink) (last visited May
30, 2007), but some legal commentators assert that ILO 169 has become binding customary
international law regardless of whether a particular country has signed it or not.  See, e.g., S.
James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the
Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 14-15 (2004).  In some cases in the Inter-
American human rights system, ILO 169 has played an important role.  See, e.g., infra notes
297, 309-12 and accompanying text (discussing Paraguay’s ratification of ILO 169 and its
importance in the Yakye Axa case).
240. Dann, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, ¶ 47 (citing Draft U.N. Declaration, supra
note 85, art. 26; Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra
note 60, art. XVIII).
241. Id. ¶¶ 53, 56.
242. Id. ¶ 54 (citing U.N. ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the United
Nations Seminar on the Effects of Racism and Racial Discrimination on the Relations Between
Indigenous Peoples and States, 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/22, HR/PUB/89/5 (Feb. 8, 1989)).
243. Id. ¶ 55.
244. Id. ¶ 58 (citing Mabo v. Queensland I (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186 (Austl.)).  
245. Id. ¶ 93.  As of the drafting of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States in 1987, all countries appeared to acknowledge certain core rights to private
property.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
cmt. k (1987).  Still, disagreement among countries about the scope of the human right to
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People and article 26 of the Draft United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for the principle that
the United States should recognize the laws, customs, and land tenure system of
the Shoshone.240
The Danns complained that the United States failed to give them equal
protection under the law since the United States did not afford the same level of
protection to the Danns’ aboriginal property rights as the State offers for the
property rights of non-Indians.241  As evidence, the Danns cited the State’s
justification of “encroachment” as a method of extinguishing indigenous
property rights; the Danns claimed that this amounted to little more than a legal
reward for trespassers and cited a United Nations report that such transfers of
property as a result of trespass constitute systemic discrimination against
indigenous people.242  Finally, even were the State to claim that the State had
granted title over the land to others, such an action did not occur with the
protections of the 5th Amendment.243  The Danns cited to the Mabo case for the
proposition that legislation that purports to extinguish native title may be unfair
and discriminatory towards indigenous peoples.244 
To counter these claims, the United States specifically rejected the claim of
a violation of article XXIII (right to property) on the basis that the right protects
only individual property rights, not those of groups such as the Shoshone.245  The
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property led drafters to conclude that such disagreements meant that the right to property had
not become a principle of customary international law.  Id. (noting that the right to property is
not an international human right).
246. Dann, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, ¶ 94.
247. Id. ¶¶ 76, 82-91.
248. Id. ¶ 80.
249. Id.
250. Id. ¶¶ 83-84.
251. Id. ¶¶ 83-85.  Compensation of over $26 million was based on the 1872 estimated land
value of fifteen cents per acre plus loss of gold and other resources.  Id. ¶ 85.
252. Id. ¶¶ 96-98.
253. Id. ¶ 97.
United States also argued that the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous People and ILO 169 do not form appropriate bases for the petition
to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights since the United States has
not signed or ratified these agreements.246  The United States also defended its
actions by arguing that the ownership of the land in question had been part of a
lengthy administrative process to determine ownership.247  The United States
admitted that the Shoshone had traditionally occupied much of Nevada, that the
United States does recognize the rights of aboriginal peoples to occupy and use
their traditional lands, and that the land in question had been ceded to the United
States by Mexico in 1848 subject to the occupancy of the Native Americans.248
The United States claimed, however, that it had subsequently treated much land
traditionally occupied by the Shoshone as federal land.249  Under the ruling of
the Mabo case, such treatment of land inconsistent with the recognition of
aboriginal title would effectively extinguish that title.  Thus, the United States
acknowledged that it had taken land of the Shoshone.250  The United States
claimed, however, that this taking had been compensated for by payment
according to proper legal processes.251
In analyzing the case, the Commission noted that interpretation of the
American Declaration should take place in light of all its provisions as well as
other cases and developments in international human rights law since the
American Declaration was written.252  Furthermore, the Commission emphasized
that such developments in international human rights law specifically included
the American Convention on Human Rights as an “authoritative expression of
the fundamental principles set forth in the American Declaration.”253  
In its considerations, the Commission noted that the human rights of
indigenous groups have unique qualities.  For instance, the Commission said that
there exists a
collective aspect of indigenous rights, in the sense of rights that are
realized in part or in whole through their guarantee to groups or
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255. Id. ¶ 137.
256. Id. ¶ 138.
257. Id. ¶ 139.
258. Id. ¶¶ 135-45.
259. Id. ¶ 172.
260. Id. ¶ 173.
organizations of people.  And this recognition has extended to
acknowledgement of a particular connection between communities
of indigenous peoples and the lands and resources that they have
traditionally occupied and used, the preservation of which is
fundamental to the effective realization of the human rights of
indigenous peoples more generally and therefore warrants special
measures of protection.  The Commission has observed, for example,
that continued utilization of traditional collective systems for the
control and use of territory are in many instances essential to the
individual and collective well-being, and indeed the survival of,
indigenous peoples and that control over the land refers both its
capacity for providing the resources which sustain life, and to the
geographic space necessary for the cultural and social reproduction
of the group.254
In setting out its findings of fact, the Commission concluded that the question
of whether Shoshone aboriginal title rights had been extinguished was never
effectively litigated.255  While the Commission commended the United States for
having established an administrative procedure for dealing with indigenous land
claims,256 the Commission also concluded that the procedure had failed to live
up to contemporary international law protections of the rights of indigenous
peoples to their traditional lands.257 The Commission found that the process did
not afford an opportunity for the Danns to participate, failed to offer the same
protections given to others in a takings case, and failed to argue fairly on the
merits where and when indigenous land rights had been extinguished.258  As a
result, the Commission found that the United States had violated articles II,
XVIII, and XXIII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
by failing to equally protect the rights of the Danns to property.259  The
Commission recommended that the United States review its laws, procedures,
and practices and adopt necessary legislation or procedures to protect the right
of indigenous peoples — including the Danns — to property, as required by the
American Declaration.260
The United States has largely disregarded the recommendations of the
Commission.  According to one source, the U.S. government continues to
threaten the Danns with huge fines for grazing cattle on land the U.S.
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261. See Indian Law Resource Center, Western Shoshone / Dann Case,
http://www.indianlaw.org/main/projects/past_projects/ws_dann (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).  In
addition, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressed
concern that U.S. treatment of the Shoshone fails to meet the international standards to which
the United States has bound itself by treaty.  See, e.g., Erica Bulman, U.N. Backs Shoshone’s
Dispute, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Mar. 11, 2006, at B06.
262.  Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004), available at http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm   The Inter-American Commission released Report No.
96/03 in 2003 for this same case.  Id. ¶ 188.  Subsequent to Report No. 96/03, the Commission
received a request from Belize for permission to publish the report.  Id. ¶ 190.  The Commission
received no other communication from Belize during the sixty days following transmission of
Report No. 96/03 to Belize.  Id. ¶ 191.
263. Id. ¶ 2.  The Mopan Maya also claimed violations of articles I, III, VI, XI, and XX, but
the Commission only found violations of II, XVIII, and XXIII.  Id. at ¶¶ 2, 194-96.  The
Commission also reaffirmed that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
constitutes an international legal obligation for all members of the Organization of American
States.  Id. ¶ 85.  
XXBelize, like the United States, is not subject to the American Convention on Human Rights
but solely to the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.  See Office of Int’l
Law, Org. of Am. States, American Convention on Human Rights Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.html (last visited May 30, 2007).  Thus the case
could not be referred to the Inter-American Court.  See American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 65, art. 62.
government claims it owns, and continues to threaten the Danns with cutting off
their access to ancestral lands and taking the cattle and horses that the Danns
pasture on what the Danns say are traditional Shoshone lands.261
5. The Mopan Maya Case (Belize)262
The 2004 case of the Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District
of Belize provides a compelling example of the international human right to
communal property.  On facts similar to those in Awas Tingni, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights found an analogous property right
for the Mopan Maya of southern Belize, but this time the Commission
grounded the right squarely in international law, and applied it in a common
law jurisdiction.
The Mopan Maya submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission
alleging that the government of Belize had violated, inter alia, articles II (right
to equality before the law), XVIII (right to a fair trial), and XXIII (right to
property) of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.263
The Mopan Maya based these allegations on four primary factual bases: (1)
the Mopan Maya had traditionally used and occupied the area in question; (2)
the state had failed to delineate, demarcate, and legally recognize the land of
the Mopan Maya; (3) the state had granted logging and oil concessions in
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264. Maya, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶ 20.
265. Id. ¶¶ 40, 48.  The Maya noted that, barring contradictory domestic precedent, Belize
typically looked to precedents in other countries.  Id. ¶ 48.  The Maya then went on to cite
precedents from several common law countries.  Id. ¶ 48 n.39 (citing  United States v. Shoshone
Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 116-18 (1938); Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 69
(Austl.) (Brennan, J.); Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.); R. v.
Van Der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.); Adong bin Kuwau v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor, [1997]
1 M.L.J. 418 (H.C.) (Malay.); Amodu Tijani v. Sec’y, S. Provinces, [1921] 3 N.L.R. 21 (S.C.)
(Nig.)).
266. Id. ¶ 40.
267. Id. ¶ 72.
268. Id. ¶¶ 108, 133.  For the importance of title to land versus reservations and the security
of indigenous land tenure, see infra Part VI.
269. See Maya, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶ 59 n.52, ¶ 72 n.57.
270. Id. ¶¶ 113-14, 117.
areas claimed by the Maya without consulting the Maya; and (4) the Maya had
been subjected to unreasonable delay in their domestic legal proceedings to
protect their property right.264
The Maya asserted in their petition that the common law recognized their
aboriginal rights,265 but then went on to argue that, even if it did not, the
domestic law of Belize is not determinative of their property rights because
international law grants rights to which the common law must conform.266
Belize, in turn, argued that it was factually unclear that the Maya had land
rights and claimed a common law test different than that advocated by the
Maya.267  In its analysis, the Commission pointed out that the problem in this
case was not so much that the state owns the land through a reservation
system, but that there is no clarity or certainty in the tenure of the Mayans on
their traditional lands because the lands were never delimited or demarcated,
nor were the rights of the Maya to these lands defined.268
Both parties applied the Mabo test for aboriginal title, focusing on the facts
most favorable to their position.269  The Commission, however, emphasized
that international law had continued to develop an obligation of states to
respect the traditional communal property of indigenous peoples due to its
importance to their cultural survival.270  Thus, the Commission made it clear
that it was not relying on domestic property law for its conclusions.  Instead,
citing to cases in the European human rights system, the court stated: 
[T]he organs of the inter-American human rights system have
recognized that the property rights protected by the system are not
limited to those property interests that are already recognized by
states or that are defined by domestic law, but rather that the right
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271. Id. ¶ 117 (emphasis added).
272. Id. ¶ 131.
273. Id. ¶ 113.
274. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125
(June 17, 2005).  Yakye Axa is no longer the final word from the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights regarding the international human right to communal property.  After completion
of the manuscript for this Article, the court issued its opinion in  Sawahoyamaxa Indigenous
Cmty. v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. (ser.  C) No. 146 (March 29, 2006),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_146_esp2.pdf.  The Sawhoyamoxa case
involves similar issues to the Yakye Axa case.  For example, the Court found that Paraguay
violated article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights.  Id. at 144.  The
Sawhoyamaxa case also considered the conflict between existing rational use of land and claims
to that land by indigenous people.  Id. at ¶¶ 135, 139, 210-15.
275. See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 125 (June 17, 2005).   ¶¶ 50.108, 96, 154, 202, 215 (referring to the derecho a la propiedad
comunitaria and the derecho a la propiedad comunal of indigenous peoples).
276. Id. ¶¶ 50.2-.3.
277. Id. ¶ 50.2.
to property has an autonomous meaning in international human
rights law.271
The Commission concluded that “the communal property right of the Maya
people is not dependent upon particular interpretations of domestic judicial
decisions concerning the possible existence of aboriginal rights under
common law.”272  The Commission reasoned that this right must be viewed as
a collective right in the case of indigenous peoples, because in these
communities “rights and freedoms are frequently exercised and enjoyed . . .
in a collective manner, in the sense that they can only be properly ensured
through their guarantee to an indigenous community as a whole.”273  
6. The Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay
During the summer of 2005 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
released its latest opinion related to the human right to communal property —
the Yakye Axa case.274  The case presents the clearest example to date of the
court explaining the importance of land to indigenous peoples and finding a
sui generis right to communal property.  In fact, for the first time, the court
names the right as the human right to communal property.275
The Yakye Axa community consists of indigenous people that historically
engaged in hunting and gathering — thus utilizing a large area of land — but
that are now sedentary.276  The Chaco area of Paraguay where they reside
underwent occupation by non-indigenous people at the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth century.277  During this period, parts of the
Chaco were sold on the London stock market and missionaries began to enter
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278. Id. ¶ 50.10.
279. Id. ¶ 50.11.
280. Id. ¶ 50.12.
281. Id.  Estribo means stirrup.
282. Id. ¶ 50.13.
283. Id. ¶¶ 50.12-.14.
284. Id. ¶ 50.15.  This marginalization prevented the Yakye Axa community from freely
exercising their cultural practices.  Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. ¶ 50.16.
287. Id. ¶¶ 50.17-.22.
288. Id. ¶ 50.24. 
289. Id. ¶ 50.37.
the indigenous territory that had been sold.278  Anglican missionaries began
operation of cattle ranches in the area, including the first one in the area to
employ indigenous people living on the ranch.279  
In 1979, the Anglican church began a project in which the church acquired
various new ranches with a plan to resettle indigenous communities currently
on other ranches and supply them with agricultural and educational
assistance.280  One of these ranches was El Estribo.281  The Yakye Axa
community, located on the Loma Verde ranch — part of the ancestral territory
of the Yakye Axa community — suffered from a severe lack of food and
health services, unpaid or very low wages, and sexual exploitation of the
women by Paraguayan workers.282  Thus, in 1986, the community moved to
the resettlement ranch of El Estribo even though that ranch was located far
away from the land on which the community traditionally lived.283  However,
another indigenous group already lived at El Estribo and marginalized the
newly-arrived Yakye Axa community.284  The Yakye Axa suffered from a lack
of food and water at this new site as well, and many of the youngest and oldest
community members died as a result.285  
By 1993 the Yakye Axa community decided to begin the administrative
process of reclaiming their ancestral land in and around the Loma Verde
ranch.286  The process began with the community asking the state to formally
recognize the community’s leaders and the legal personhood of the
community — a process which lasted eight years.287  In 1993, the community
approached the Institute of Rural Welfare (IRW) to inform the agency that the
community wished to reclaim its original territory in and around the Loma
Verde and other ranches.288
In 1998, a legal consultant for the IRW determined that the Loma Verde
ranch indeed comprised part of the “traditional habitat” of the Yakye Axa
community,289 and opined that the constitution of Paraguay indicated the rights
of the indigenous people to their ancestral territory is “prior to and superior
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290. Id.  The legal consultant based this opinion on an interpretation of article 62 of
Paraguay’s constitution, which states that “[t]his Constitution recognizes the existence of the
indigenous villages, defined as cultural groups prior to the formation and organization of the
State of Paraguay.”  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PARAGUAY DE 1992 art. 62 (“Esta
Constitución reconoce la existencia de los pueblos indígenas, definidos como grupos de cultura
anteriores a la formación y organización del Estado paraguayo.”).
291. Yakye Axa, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 50.38.
292. Id. ¶¶ 97, 142 (citing Ley No. 904/81, 18 Dec. 1981, Que establece el Estatuto de las
Comunidades Indigenas [That Establishes the Statute of Indigenous Communities] (Para.); Ley
No. 854/63, 29 Mar. 1963, Que establece el Estatuto Agrario [That Establishes the Agrarian
Statute] (Para.)).  This represents part of the doctrine of the social function of land in Latin
America: if agricultural land is fulfilling the social function, it may be expropriated by the state,
and conversely, if the land is fulfilling the social function, it may not be expropriated for land
reform.  See generally Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 71, at 69.
293. Yakye Axa, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 50.40-.44.  The three
corporations were the Livestock Capital Group, Inc.; Florida Agricultural Corporation; and
Agricultural Development, Inc.  Id. ¶ 50.40.  The Florida Agricultural Corporation and
Agricultural Development, Inc., were corporations registered in the state of Florida, United
States, until their administrative dissolution for failure to file their 2003 annual report.  See Fla.
Dep’t of State, Div. of Corps., Inquire by Name http://www.sunbiz.org/corinam.html (search
for either “Florida Agricultural” or “Agricultural Development”; then follow “Florida
Agricultural Corporation [Document No.] S02074” hyperlink or “Agricultural Development,
Inc. [Document No.] S02904” hyperlink, respectively) (last visited May 30, 2007).
294. Yakye Axa, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 50.56-.60.
295. Id. ¶ 50.61.
296. See id. ¶ 50.62.
to” the rights of the private landowners now claiming the land.290  A few
months after this, the IRW declared that the Loma Verde ranch was being
“rationally exploited,”291 thus removing the authority of the IRW to
expropriate the property.292 
The Paraguayan Indigenous Institute and IRW sought to enter into
negotiations with the corporations that owned the land claimed by the
community, but to no avail.293  The Paraguayan Senate (camara de
sendadores) then considered laws to provide for expropriation of Loma Verde,
but twice rejected such laws before approving a law in October 2003 to give
title of a smaller and different piece of land to the Yakye Axa community and
another indigenous community.294  The Yakye Axa community rejected this
offer since they had never even been consulted about this option.295  By this
time ten years had passed since the Yakye Axa had first begun their efforts to
reclaim their ancestral territory.
During these events, the community had been engaged in legal battles to
protect themselves and their claims.  The community filed a suit for protection
of their constitutional rights in March of 1997.296  In this suit, the community
noted that they had been denied entry into their traditional lands to hunt or
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297. See id.  See generally Ley No. 234/93, 10 Aug. 1993, Que ratifica el Convenio No. 169
sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Paises Independientes de la Organización Internacional
del Trabajo [That Ratifies ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
in Independent Countries] art. 14 (Para.).
298. See Yakye Axa, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 50.63.
299. See id. ¶ 50.85.
300. See id. ¶ 50.87.
301. Id. ¶¶ 86-89, 94, 97-98, 104.
302. See supra text accompanying note 220.
303. Yakye Axa, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 74 (citing CONSTITUCIÓN
POLÍTICA DEL PARAGUAY DE 1992 art. 64).
304. Id. ¶¶ 94, 97.
305. Id. ¶¶ 120-56.
306. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 50.11, 124, 216.
fish, and that this denial violated both the Paraguayan constitution as well as
the Paraguayan law that ratified ILO 169.297  The suit was dismissed on
procedural grounds.298  
Not only did the community fail in its constitutional suit, but a judge ruled
against the community in a suit for trespass and forbid any members of the
community from hunting, cutting trees, or even drinking water on the land
they claimed in the Loma Verde ranch.299  The court went as far as ordering
removal of the community from their roadside encampment where the Yakye
Axa had been residing since attempting to return to their previous Loma Verde
ranch home and being refused entry.300
After noting these and other findings, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights concluded, inter alia, that the administrative delays by Paraguay and
the ineffectiveness of the administrative measures designed to protect the
Yakye Axa community’s right to communal property constituted violations of
the right to judicial protection.301  Much like in the Awas Tingni case,302 the
court here found a lack of judicial protection because the domestic procedures
of Paraguay failed to live up to the legal protections written in Paraguay’s
domestic law.  For example, the court noted that the constitution of Paraguay
guarantees indigenous peoples rights to communal property and that they may
not be transferred or removed from their land without their express consent.303
Despite this and other laws supposedly protecting indigenous rights to
communal property, the court noted that the administrative process of the state
failed to effectively secure these rights.304
The court then considered whether Paraguay had violated the right to
property of the community that is protected by article 21 of the American
Convention on Human Rights.305  The Court began by making several crucial
observations that guided its reasoning.  First, the court emphasized the cultural
importance of land to indigenous people.306  Second, the court noted that
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
730 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:681
307. Id. ¶ 125 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 65, art. 29).
308. Id. ¶ 129 (citing American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 65, art. 29(b)).
309. Id. ¶ 130; see also Ley No. 234/93, 10 Aug. 1993, Que ratifica el Convenio No. 169
sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Paises Independientes de la Organización Internacional
del Trabajo [That Ratifies ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
in Independent Countries] art. 14 (Para.).
310. Yakye Axa, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 127, 130.  
311. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 131, 135, 147, 154.
312. Id. ¶ 137.
313. Id. ¶¶ 142-43.
314. Id. ¶ 143.
315. Id. ¶ 144.
316. Id. ¶ 147.
317. Id. ¶ 148 (citing American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 65, art. 21, para.
2).  The Court added that this does not necessarily mean that when state or private property
rights conflict with indigenous property rights, the latter will always prevail over the former.
Id. ¶ 149.  But if a state cannot return indigenous land to the indigenous community, the
resulting compensation should be oriented towards the important relationship between
indigenous cultures and their lands.  Id.
international human rights law is dynamic and evolutionary in the context of
changing times and circumstances.307  Third, the American Convention on
Human Rights forbids the court from interpreting the Convention to limit
rights under a country’s domestic law or any treaty signed by the country.308
Since Paraguay had ratified the International Labour Organization’s
Convention No. 169 on Indigenous Peoples and incorporated it into domestic
law,309 the court interpreted the American Convention with the aid of ILO
169.310  This interpretation, along with recognition of the unique and close
association of indigenous cultures with their land and resources,311 led the
court to conclude that all of the cultural needs of indigenous people related to
property should receive the protection of property guaranteed by article 21 of
the American Convention on Human Rights.312  
This conclusion led the court to address Paraguay’s argument that the
property rights of the private owners with title to the ancestral land of the
Yakye Axa community were also protected by the American Convention on
Human Rights.313  While the court agreed,314 it emphasized that the
Convention and the court’s own jurisprudence provided guidelines on how to
proceed and which restrictions are acceptable in conflicts between indigenous
rights to property and the rights of private individuals.315  Infringement of
indigenous rights to property often affects other basic rights of an entire
community,316 whereas infringement of individual private property rights may
be necessary to achieve societal aims and may be offset by payment of just
compensation — a right also recognized by the American Convention.317  
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318. Id. ¶ 242(2).
319. Id. ¶¶ 193-94, 232.
320. Id. ¶¶ 199-206.
321. Id. ¶ 207(a), (c)-(d).
322. One difference, however, is that the Yakye Axa community sought to reclaim ancestral
lands they did not currently occupy whereas the Awas Tingni were seeking protection primarily
for land they still occupied.  The judgment in Yakye Axa also, like Awas Tingni, demands that
the state pass laws and regulations to bring itself into compliance with the American Convention
on Human Rights.  Id. ¶ 207.  Yakye Axa added the additional requirement on the state of
creating and funding a community development fund for the community.  Id. ¶ 205.
323. See id. ¶ 215, 233; supra text accompanying note 226.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 219-23, 301-12.
325. See supra text accompanying note 220.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 301-04.
327. Yakye Axa, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 152. 
The court thus held that Paraguay violated the right to property in article 21
of the American Convention on Human Rights.318  The court awarded the
Yakye Axa community $15,000 in material damages and costs,319 and
$950,000 for all other damages.320  Furthermore, the court ordered Paraguay
to grant free title of traditional Yakye Axa land to the community, to adopt
domestic procedures to secure the legal rights Paraguayan law grants
indigenous peoples, and to acknowledge publicly the human rights violations
that harmed the Yakye Axa community.321
The Yakye Axa case resembles in many respects the Awas Tingni case.322
Both cases resulted in a judgment requiring the violating state to delimit,
demarcate, and title land to the plaintiff indigenous communities.323  In both
cases the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ analysis contained dual
pillars consisting of domestic legal protections and international legal
protections;324 the court, however, never made clear if either independently
resulted in a violation of the American Convention’s property protections, or
if both were necessary.  In Awas Tingni, the court concluded that Nicaragua
had failed to provide effective administrative processes to realize the right to
delimiting, demarcating, and titling indigenous land as provided for by law;325
and in Yakye Axa the court said the same of Paraguay’s procedures.326  
Yakye Axa does, however, apply more textual legal analysis and strenghten
the analytical foundations for protection of indigenous property rights under
article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights.  Additionally, the
court emphasized the need of the state to cooperate with indigenous
communities rather than simply presenting a fait accompli to the community
that the state assumes resolves the issue.327  Potentially, however, the most
important parallel between Awas Tingni and Yakye Axa lies in the future.  Just
as Awas Tingni’s court relied on the dual pillars of favorable domestic law and
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328. See, e.g., Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶¶ 114, 116, 120 (2004),
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm; Coulter v. Brazil
(Yanomami), Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/85, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev.
1 ¶ 2 (Considering) (1985), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/84.85eng/Brazil7615
.htm; id. ¶ 3(b) (Resolves); Yakye Axa, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 120(c),
124, 131-37; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec_79_ing.pdf.
329. See, e.g., Yanomami, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/85, ¶¶ 1-3 (Resolves); Awas
Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153.
330. See, e.g., Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶¶ 131, 140 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
annualrep/2002eng/USA.11140.htm; Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶
114, 138.
331. See, e.g., Maya, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶¶ 95-97, 167; Dann, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, ¶ 125.
332. See, e.g., Maya, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶¶ 117, 131.
333. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 113-14, 117; Dann, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, ¶¶ 167-68;
Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 146.
international law, so does Yakye Axa.  And just as the Awas Tingni holding of
a right to delimiting, demarcating, and titling subsequently stood on its own
in the Commission’s Mopan Maya case without the favorable domestic law
of the Awas Tingni, the future likely holds a case where the Inter-American
Court will find an indigenous right to communal property in the absence of
Paraguay’s favorable domestic law.  
During the two decades spanning the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights’ decision in Yanomami and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights’ decision in Yakye Axa, the inter-American human rights
system made important pronouncements related to the emerging human right
to communal property.  These included statements on the important role land
and resources play for indigenous peoples;328 the need to demarcate
indigenous lands;329 the need for effective domestic systems to protect
indigenous land rights;330 the role of discrimination in indigenous land
issues;331 the existence of an independent international basis for the human
right to communal property;332 and the dynamic, progressive nature of human
rights law and its interpretations.333  Taken together, these cases articulate a
vision of property that can be held communally, and they indicate a duty on
the part of governments to recognize indigenous rights in that property.  The
precise nature and quality of that right, however, remains shrouded in
ambiguity.
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334. Cf., e.g., Marc Bossuyt, International Human Rights Systems: Strengths and
Weaknesses, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 47, 52
(Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1992) (noting that civil rights primarily require
state abstention from action whereas social rights require active intervention from the state). 
335. One common misperception is that communal property cannot be private property.  See
supra text accompanying notes 10-12 (distinguishing between open access and property owned
by a defined group and noting that the latter is “private” in that the those outside the defined
group of owners may be excluded).
336. See, e.g., Maya, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶ 132 (“Accompanying the
existence of the Maya people’s communal right to property under Article XXIII of the
Declaration is a correspondent obligation on the State to recognize and guarantee the enjoyment
of this right.  In this regard, the Commission shares the view of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights that this obligation necessarily requires the State to effectively delimit and
demarcate the territory to which the Maya people’s property right extends and to take the
appropriate measures to protect the right of the Maya people in their territory, including official
recognition of that right.” (footnote omitted)).
V. The Analytical Basis for the International Human Right to Communal
Property
Analysis of the emerging right to communal property can be viewed from
two theoretical foundations.  The first consists of the traditional western
concept of a right to property free from arbitrary government interference,
combined with a right to be free from racial, ethnic, or cultural discrimination.
The other foundation arises from the simple assertion that the indigenous right
to property is truly sui generis in the western property paradigm.  This latter
view often relies on the necessity of positing the sui generis right to property
for indigenous peoples to realize other group-based human rights as a distinct,
and distinctly different, “bundle of rights.”  This Part examines these two
conceptual foundations and their meaning for the developing right to
communal property.
A. One Plus One Equals Three: The Third-Generation Right to Communal
Property as a Combination of First-Generation Rights 
The Inter-American cases arguably demonstrate an expansion from a
“negative” right to property to what could be termed a “positive” right to
property for indigenous people.334  The negative “first-generation” right to
property only required that governments not interfere with or actively
eliminate private property.  A positive right to property goes further.  It
specifically requires that governments take some affirmative steps to protect,
or create, private property, in this case communally-owned indigenous land.335
For example, one such postive step might be enacting legislation and
regulations to create effective legal processes for identifying, demarcating,
and titling indigenous lands.336  The negative right to property has become so
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
734 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:681
337. See, e.g.,  U.S. CONST. amend. V; CONSTITUCIÓN ARGENTINA [CONST. ARG.] art. 17;
CONSTITUCIÓN DE BELICE DE 1981 § 3(d); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE
BOLIVIA DE 1967 art. 7; CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 5, §§ 22-23 (Braz.); CONSTITUCIÓN
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE DE 1980 art. 19, no. 24; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1991
art. 58 (Colom.);  CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1985 CON LAS REFORMAS DE 1993 art. 39 (Guat.);
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1982 arts. 61, 103, 105-06 (Hond.); JAMAICA (CONSTITUTION)
ORDER IN COUNCIL 1962 arts. 13, 18; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA
[CN.] [Constitution] tit. I, art. 5, La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 Jan. 1987, as amended by Ley No. 192, 1
Feb. 1995, Reforma Parcial a la Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua, L.G., 4 July
1995; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PARAGUAY DE 1992 art. 109; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL
PERU DE 1993 arts. 2, 70; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY
DE 1967 CON LAS MODIFICACIONES HASTA 1996 arts. 7, 32; cf. supra Part III.B.1.  While the
first-generation right to property enjoys virtually uniform acceptance, the scope of the right
varies tremendously.  See, e.g., Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 71.  Even Cuba recognizes
first-generation property rights, though they may be more limited in scope than in other
countries.  See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1976 CON REFORMAS HASTA 2002 arts. 19, 21-
24 (Cuba), available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/cuba.htm.
338. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 67, art. 14; American
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 65, art. 21; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 57, art. 1, para. 2; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, supra note 59, art. 25; Protocol (No. 1) to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 61, art. 1; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 64, art. 17; American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, supra note 66, art. XXIII.  This history of explicit protection of the right to
property goes back much farther in the western legal tradition, beginning in written form with
the Magna Carta in 1215.  See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (referring to Magna
Carta’s protection of the possession and use of property).
339. See, e.g., DOWELL-JONES, supra note 56, at 14-19.
340. See, e.g., id. at 4.  
widely accepted as a first-generation right that it appears in the constitution
of every country in the western hemisphere,337 as well as most human rights
documents.338  The human right to communal property has not enjoyed the
same level of support.  
One complaint raised against second and third-generation rights is that they
represent nonjusticiable issues and require costly positive actions on the part
of states that may lack the resources to enforce these rights.339  The facile
effort to classify rights as “negative” or “positive,” however, fails to take
account of the fact that some rights commonly conceived of as first generation
or “negative” rights (such as that to a speedy trial) require a substantial
positive investment on the part of the state, whereas some rights considered
“positive” (such as the right to unionize) require little expenditure on the part
of the state.340  
This same argument applies for the protection of property rights.  Some
might claim that the right to communal property is a “positive” right since it
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341. See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 40-42 (Austl.) (Brennan, J.);
Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty. & Others 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) ¶¶ 92-99 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.constitutionallaw.co.za/alert/cases/alexkor.pdf; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 140(b) (Aug. 31, 2001),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf.
342. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; id. art. 13, para. 1(b); id. art. 55; African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 67, art. 2; American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 65, art. 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, art.
2, para. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 59, art.
2, para. 2; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ.
T.S. No. 5; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 64, art. 2. 
343.   Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶¶ 164-65 (2004), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm (citing Juridical Condition &
Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18,
¶¶ 83, 173 (Sept. 17, 2003)) (asserting that equality and nondiscrimination form part of general
international law and have risen to the level of jus cogens).
344. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE
COSTA RICA art. 33; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ DE 1972 art. 19;
CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] art. XIV (Spain).
will impose affirmative burdens on states to identify, demarcate, and title
indigenous lands.  These costs, however, do not differ greatly from those
incurred in protection of the popular notions of private property by the public,
the state, and the judicial system.  Costs of protecting these rights include:
filing fees for titles, local and state expenditures to develop property registry
systems and maintain them, and the tremendous contribution of the judicial
system in conflict resolution, including quiet-title actions.  Considered in this
light, the costs to recognize the international human right to communal
property only appear greater because the costs come due all at once, as
western governments have refused to pay any of the costs for centuries.  
Viewed from this perspective, treating the human right to communal
property as a “positive” right says more about the past refusal of western legal
systems to recognize the communal property rights of indigenous peoples than
it says about the present difficulty of recognizing and protecting such
interests.  This past refusal to recognize indigenous property rights rests
largely on discrimination.341  Nevertheless, international treaties, covenants,
and declarations clearly prohibit discrimination on many bases and require
equality of treatment for all peoples.342  International cases reiterate this
requirement.343  Similarly, most states have various levels of constitutional or
statutory protections for equality and prohibitions on discrimination.344
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345. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
346. RACHEL SIEDER, CUSTOMARY LAW AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN GUATEMALA 53
(1997).
347. See supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.
348. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 162-63 (detailing the culturally biased basis
for a broad conception of terra nullius).
349. Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land, supra note 79, ¶ 48 (describing
the plenary power doctrine, in which the “United States Congress may exercise virtually
unlimited power over indigenous nations and tribes and their property.  No other population or
group is subject to such limitless and potentially abusive governmental power.”).
350. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶¶ 143-45 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
annualrep/2002eng/USA.11140.htm.
351. See, e.g., Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶¶ 157-71 (2004), available
at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm; see also S. James Anaya,
Environmentalism, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: A Tale of Converging and
Diverging Interests, 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2000).
Freedom from state-structured discrimination is a civil and political, or “first
generation,” human right.345 
If we treat indigenous peoples “equally,” we cannot help but recognize their
distinct forms of land tenure.  “Equality before the law must encompass
cultural diversity and difference, or it risks being discriminatory by failing to
recognise that cultural diversity.”346  For example, what, other than racial or
cultural discrimination, could explain the failure to recognize the property
rights of native people living on Greenland when Denmark and Norway were
fighting in the International Court of Justice for control over the island?347  In
Mabo the court noted that the justifications for applying the terra nullius
doctrine to indigenous lands were founded on a failure to appreciate cultural
differences in land tenure practices.348  Commentators have noted racism in
the United States’ “plenary power” doctrine towards North American
Indians.349  The IACHR also implied a charge of racism against the United
States when it concluded that the United States had not protected the land of
Shoshone Indians to the same degree as it protected the land of non-Indians.350
Once we acknowledge that many indigenous groups traditionally hold land
collectively, prohibitions on racial discrimination dictate that the state must
protect that right the same as the state protects the property of an individual
under the first generation of human rights.  The negative, or first generation,
human right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of property, coupled with
prohibitions on discrimination, lead to protection of indigenous communal
property rights.351  
Thus, one theoretical approach is that an assiduous application of
antidiscrimination law and private property protections will suffice to protect
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352. Kingsbury, supra note 60, at 197-99 (citing the Australian case of Gerhardy v. Brown
(1985) 159 C.L.R. 70, in which a trespass defendant challenged as discriminatory the law under
which he was being prosecuted and which sought to protect the property of a defined indigenous
group).
353. Cf. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 79, ¶ 151 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec_79_ing.pdf; see also Maya, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶ 6.
354. See, e.g., Kingsbury, supra note 60.  
355. Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 89 (Austl.) (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.);
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1081 (Can.).  
356. I.e., the rights to a healthy environment, self-determination, religion, etc.  See Maya,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶ 114-154; id. ¶ 154 (observing that, in addition to
violating the right to property, “the failure of the State to engage in meaningful consultation
with the Maya people in connection with the logging and oil concessions in the Toledo District,
the right of indigenous peoples to communal land.  Under this analysis, the
developing international human right to property simply demonstrates that one
(first-generation right to property) plus one (first-generation freedom from
discrimination) equals three (third-generation right to communal property).
B. The Sui Generis Nature of the Communal Right to Property
Some observers are less sanguine about the use of antidiscrimination law
and traditional property protections to secure the land rights of indigenous
peoples because antidiscrimination laws may, in some instances, be used as
a bar to protection of indigenous lands.352  Despite the appeal of the argument
that the international human right to communal property represents nothing
more than an acknowledgement of the failure to incorporate communal
property into western property protections, this conclusion seems too facile
because the right also appears different in two important respects: (1) the
purpose of the right is partly founded on the right of indigenous groups to
maintain their cultural identity and, related to this, (2) the right requires that
the legal norms governing communal tenure are the customary laws of the
indigenous group.353  The first-generation human right to property does not
necessarily consider either of these differences,354 even as the sui generis right
to property could impose limitations on communal titles granted to indigenous
people that may impede the evolution of indigenous property rights.
The differences between traditional western notions of “right to property”
and the right of indigenous peoples to communal property may be so great that
the international human right to communal property truly is sui generis.355
One reason for ascribing a fundamentally different nature to the international
human right to communal property is that the right, in part, developed from
the practical necessity of this right to indigenous peoples’ ability to exercise
other human rights.356  
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and the negative environmental effects arising from those concessions, constitute violations of
several other rights under international human rights law, including the right to life under
Article I of the American Declaration, the right to religious freedom and worship under Article
III of the American Declaration, the right to a family and to protection thereof under Article VI
of the American Declaration, the right to preservation of health and well-being under Article XI
of the American Declaration, and the ‘right to consultation’ implicit in Article 27 of the ICCPR,
Article XX of the American Declaration, and the principle of self-determination”); id. ¶ 156
(“[T]he Commission considers that the additional claims raised by the Petitioners are subsumed
within the broad violations of Article XXIII of the American Declaration determined by the
Commission in this case and therefore need not be determined.”); see also ILO 169, supra note
80, art. 13.
357. One of the earliest examples of this right in international law came with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “In those states in which ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right,
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”  International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 57, art. 27.  For discussion of international cases based on article
27 of the ICCPR, see Kingsbury, supra note 60, at 203-08.
358. ILO 169, supra note 80, arts. 4, 5(a); id. art. 7, paras. 1, 3; id. art. 13, para. 1.  
359. Draft U.N. Declaration, supra note 85, art. 9 (“Indigenous peoples and individuals have
the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and
customs of the community or nation concerned.  No disadvantage of any kind may arise from
the exercise of such a right.”).
360. Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 60,
art. 2, para. 2 (“Indigenous peoples have the collective rights that are indispensable to the
enjoyment of the individual human rights of their members. Accordingly the states recognize
inter alia the right of the indigenous peoples to . . . their cultures.”).
361. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, arts. 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/135/Annex (Dec.
18, 1992).
362. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf. 
363. Cf., e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE BOLIVIA DE 1967 art. 171; C.F.
The human right of indigenous people to their culture provides a dramatic
example.  International law increasingly recognizes the right of indigenous
populations to maintain their own culture.357  Treaties such as ILO 169
emphasize this right,358 as do draft declarations such as the Draft United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,359 and the Proposed
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.360  The United
Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities emphasizes the right to culture as
well.361  International case law also indicates that indigenous cultures have a
right to maintain their tradition.362  Even the constitutions and laws of many
countries explicitly protect this right.363
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art. 231 (Braz.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1991 art. 330 (Colom.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA
DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ DE 1972 art. 86; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PARAGUAY DE
1992 art. 63; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE VENEZUELA art. 119.  The examples
given here are limited to Latin America as that is the focus of this article.  However, many
countries outside of Latin America also have explicit legal protections for the cultures of
indigenous populations.  Cf., e.g., KONGERIGET NORGES GRUNDLOV [Constitution] art. 110a
(Nor.); Native Title Act, 1993 (Austl.), cited in U.N. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion
& Prot. of Human Rights, Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples,
Annex I, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30/Add.1 (July 12, 2004) (prepared by Erica-Irene
A. Daes); Ob Obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii obshchin korennykh malochislennykh narodov
Severa, Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka Rossiiskoi Federatsii [On Basic Principles of Organizing
Communities of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian
Federation], Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2000, No. 30, Item 3122, cited in Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Indigenous Peoples, supra, Annex I, ¶ 11; O garantiiMakh prav korennykh
malochislennykh naradov Rossiiskoi Federatsii [On Guarantees of Rights of Indigenous Peoples
of the Russian Federation], SZ RF 1999, No. 18, Item 2208, cited in Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples, supra, Annex I, ¶ 11.
364. See Colchester et al., supra note 190, at 10-11; see also Ley No. 24, 12 Jan. 1996, Por
la cual se crea la Comarca Kuna de Madungandi [By Which the Kuna de Madungandi Region
Is Created] ch. II, art. 2 , G.O., 15 Jan. 1996 (Pan.), available at http://www.asamblea.gob.pa/
NORMAS/1990/1996/1996_138_0699.PDF (granting land collectively to the Kuna of the
region); id. ch. III, arts. 4-7 (granting qualified recognition of traditional Kuna authorities).
365. Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Ecuador, ch. IX, at 115, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, doc. 10 rev. 1 (Apr. 24, 1997) (quoting Rodolfo
Stavenhagen, Indigenous Peoples: Emerging Actors in Latin America, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND
GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 11 (Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars,
Working Paper No. 215, Ralph Espach ed., 1995)).
366. Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Peru, ch. X, ¶ 16, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 59 rev. (June 2, 2000).
Protections for culture go hand in hand with protections for the lands of
indigenous peoples.364  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
highlighted this connection by stating that property for indigenous peoples
provides resources and “the geographical space necessary for the cultural and
social reproduction of the group.”365  In a report on Peru, the IACHR stated
that “[l]and, for the indigenous peoples, is a condition of individual security
and liaison with the group.  The recovery, recognition, demarcation, and
registration of the lands represents essential rights for cultural survival and for
maintaining the community's integrity.”366
Similarly, in the Mopan Maya case, the Commission stated that it
has emphasized the distinct nature of the right to property as it
applies to indigenous people, whereby the land traditionally used
and occupied by these communities plays a central role in their
physical, cultural and spiritual vitality.  As the Commission has
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367.  Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 40/04, ¶ 155 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Ecuador, supra note 365, ch. IX, at 103), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm.
368. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 113-14.
369.  See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf. 
370. Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶ 128 (2002) (citing Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Ecuador, supra note 365, ch. IX, at 115), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/
2002eng/USA.11140.htm.
371. Maya, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶ 155 (“[T]he concept of family and
religion within the context of indigenous communities, including the Maya people, is intimately
connected with their traditional land, where ancestral burial grounds, places of religious
significance and kinship patterns are linked with the occupation and use of their physical
territories.”); id. ¶¶ 114, 120 (quoting Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, pt.
II.B, ¶ 15, at 81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc. 10 rev. 3 (Nov. 29, 1983)); id. ¶ 124.
372. Id. ¶ 155.
373. Cf. Coulter v. Brazil (Yanomami), Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 12/85,
previously recognized in respect of the right to property and the
right to equality, “[f]or indigenous people, the free exercise of such
rights is essential to the enjoyment and perpetuation of their
culture.”367
Much of what it means to be “indigenous” resides in the collective nature
of landholdings in indigenous cultures.368  In Awas Tingni, the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights noted that the right to property and community
control of land and land tenure are inseparable parts of indigenous culture.369
Finally, Dann reiterated the link between land and culture: 
The Commission has observed, for example, that continued
utilization of traditional collective systems for the control and use
of territory are in many instances essential to the individual and
collective well-being, and indeed the survival of, indigenous
peoples and that control over the land refers both to its capacity for
providing the resources which sustain life, and to the geographic
space necessary for the cultural and social reproduction of the
group.370
Inter-American human rights system cases and reports have emphasized
that the right of indigenous communities to their communal lands serves as a
foundation for other human rights, including the right to religion,371 the right
to family,372 the right to a healthy environment,373 and the right to self-
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OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 ¶ 1 (Resolves) (1985), available at http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/84.85eng/Brazil7615.htm (finding a violation of the right to preservation of health
and well being).
374.  Awas Tingni, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79.  The concept of self-
determination is an inherently collective right that can only be exercised by a group.  SMITH,
supra note 60, at 269.  
375. Maya, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, ¶¶ 155-56.  I.e., claimed violations of
articles I (right to life, liberty, and personal security), III (right to religious freedom and
worship), VI (right to a family and protection thereof), XI (right to preservation of health and
well-being), and XX (right to vote and participate in government).  Id.
376. ILO 169, supra note 80, art. 14. 
377. Russel Lawrence Barsh, An Advocate’s Guide to the Convention on Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 209, 210, 224 (1990).
determination.374  Indeed, the relationship between other rights and property
is so critical that in the Mopan Maya case the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights noted that the “distinct nature of the right to property as it
applies to indigenous people” meant that additional claims of human rights
violations by Belize were “subsumed within the broad violations of Article
XXIII (right to property) of the American Declaration determined by the
Commission in this case and therefore need not be determined.”375
Thus, indigenous communal property clearly involves a plethora of human
rights not usually associated with the more narrow concept of the first-
generation right to property.  This bundle of human rights tied together by the
right to communal property constitutes a significant theoretical departure from
the typical first-generation right to property and its associated bundle of sticks
and may not be adequately explained as one plus one equals three.
VI. The Scope of the Human Right to Communal Property
Just as the justifications for the right to communal property sometimes differ
from those of the first-generation right to property, so may the scope of the right
to communal property.  This Part examines what rights fall within the right to
communal property, including why limitations that apply to this right do not
apply generally to the first-generation right to property.
A. On Native Title and “Rights of Ownership and Possession”
An excellent place to begin an inquiry into the scope of the right to
communal property is the provision in the International Labour Organization’s
Convention No. 169 stating that indigenous peoples have “rights of ownership
and possession.”376  This language resulted from protracted negotiations on the
topic of land rights that almost doomed the entire negotiation process of ILO
169.377  Even though an earlier ILO convention had ostensibly protected the
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378. ILO, Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous
and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries art. 11, June 26, 1957,
328 U.N.T.S. 247.
379. Barsh, supra note 377, at 224.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 224-25.
382. Id. at 224.  This process was unusual because the typical procedure for the drafting
committee included discussing and voting on each single article separately.  Id.  The fact that
the parties chose to develop a “package” deal relating to property tends to indicate that the
parties involved were not necessarily in agreement on individual property-related articles but
all felt that they could live with the parts of which they did not approve as long as other articles
were also included.  Id. 
383. Id.
384. TOMEI & SWEPSTON, supra note 225.
385. Cf. id.
386. Id.
“ownership” of lands traditionally occupied by indigenous people,378 it did not
protect resources on land used by but not physically occupied by indigenous
people, nor did it address the issue of lands that had already been taken from
indigenous peoples.  The desire of indigenous people to add such considerations
during the drafting of ILO 169 met with fierce opposition.379  At two different
times a “working party” was established to negotiate wording on ownership of
lands, but both times consensus proved impossible.380  Several states worried
that granting ownership to indigenous peoples would either result in huge tracts
of land being owned by indigenous groups or that it would result in
irreconcilable constitutional land disputes.381  These difficulties finally led to an
unusual step: the chairman of the drafting conference personally conducted
closed-door negotiations with representatives of the interests involved, which led
to creation and acceptance of the “package” of land provisions included in ILO
169.382  This atypical approach resulted in a lack of a record of negotiation to
shed light on the phrase “rights of ownership and possession.”383
Despite the lack of drafting history around the phrase “rights of ownership
and possession,” the ILO has said that the phrase does not necessarily mean that
indigenous peoples always have the right to title to all land they traditionally
occupied.384  The phrase refers not to “a” right to ownership, but to “rights” of
ownership and possession; the implication is that “rights” of ownership and
possession can be interpreted to be rights related to ownership and possession,
rather than necessarily being ownership and possession themselves.385  Instead
of always mandating full ownership, this reading of ILO 169 seeks to give
indigenous peoples the greatest degree of land rights attainable, taking into
account the many different situations that may exist,386 and to afford sufficient
security of tenure so that indigenous peoples may exercise the full bundle of
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387. ILO 169, supra note 80, art. 13.
388.  Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 79, ¶ 164 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec_79_ing.pdf. 
389. See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 125, ¶ 155 (June 17, 2005) (noting that Paraguay does protect indigenous communal
property in its laws).
390. Id. ¶ 120(b); cf. id. ¶ 50.62 (noting that Paraguay has, by article 14 of Law No. 234/93,
ratified ILO 169 and the protections of indigenous rights to land contained in articles 13 through
19 of that convention).
391. The constitution of Paraguay states, in article 64, that “[t]he State will, free of charge,
provide [indigenous villages] with land, which lands shall be free of property tax, immune to
credit judgments, indivisible, nontransferable, not susceptible to acquisition by adverse
possession, not eligible to serve as collateral, and which may not be rented.”  CONSTITUCIÓN
POLÍTICA DEL PARAGUAY DE 1992 art. 64 (translation by authors), quoted in Yakye Axa, 2005
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 138.  Such restrictions are often imposed on titles of
communal property rights.  Thus, in some situations, the right to possession and
use of land traditionally occupied by indigenous people may be guaranteed
under ILO 169 if there have been assurances that such use and possession would
continue.  This might be the case where indigenous peoples are accorded
reservations but do not receive land titles, as is the case in the United States,
Belize, Costa Rica, and many other countries.  In evaluating competing
interpretations as to the level of protection required for indigenous land rights,
ILO 169 points out in article 13 that 
[i]n applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention
governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and
spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with
the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or
otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this
relationship.387
While ILO 169 does not, by its terms, explicitly require that states title the
traditionally-occupied land of indigenous peoples, the case law in the inter-
American human rights system sometimes has.  For example, in Awas Tingni the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that Nicaragua not only must
identify and physically demarcate communal property, but also title the land to
the indigenous people.388  The requirement to issue title likely arose in Awas
Tingni because the domestic law of Nicaragua provided for titling.  Thus
fulfillment of the right to communal property, as it currently stands, does not
necessarily require a title in most nations.  Yakye Axa does not state that titling
is an absolute requirement of domestic law,389 but the domestic law of Paraguay
does have substantial protections for indigenous lands,390 and these protections
may imply titling of indigenous lands.391  In the Mopan Maya case, however, the
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indigenous lands.  
392. Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 40/04, ¶ 133 (2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm#_ftnref127. 
393. The acceptability of systems like those in Canada, Costa Rica, and the United States —
where indigenous land and resources are controlled by the state under trusteeship for the
indigenous peoples — increasingly have been subjected to criticism.  See, e.g., Indigenous
Peoples and Their Relationship to Land, supra note 79, ¶ 37.
394. Cf. Maya, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04,  ¶ 132 n.135 (noting that “[i]n its
judgment in the Awas Tingni Case, the Inter-American Court determined that the failure of the
State to effectively delimit and demarcate the collective property of the Mayagna Community
of Awas Tingni had created a climate of constant uncertainty among the members of the Awas
Tingni Community, insofar as they do not know for certain how far their communal property
extends geographically and, therefore, they do not know until where they can freely use and
enjoy their respective property”); Yakye Axa, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 2
(noting that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights observed that failure to
satisfactorily resolve indigenous land claims of the Yakye Axa community resulted in a state of
constant uncertainty and vulnerability of the community for food, medical care, and sanitation
as well as threatening the continued existence of members of the community and the community
itself); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
79, ¶ 153 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_
79_ing.pdf. 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights first concluded that the Maya had
property rights to their traditionally occupied land and that “the State has not
delimited, demarcated and titled or otherwise established the legal mechanisms
necessary to clarify and protect the territory on which their right exists.”392  
Jurisprudence of the inter-American human rights system appears to reflect
the text of ILO 169 and commentary on it by asserting that the ideal way to
protect the right to communal property of indigenous peoples is through titling
of communal land.  The real purpose, however, is to protect the rights of the
indigenous people to continue using their traditionally occupied lands as a
necessary part of their culture and survival; if this may be accomplished with
less than a legal title, then that may be acceptable.393  The reservation system
also avoids the question of whether indigenous land rights must include the first-
generation right to alienate property.  What is not acceptable in the eyes of
international law is for indigenous populations to remain in a constant state of
uncertainty and fear about the security and extent of the land to which they have
rights.394
B. Restraints on Alienability and Related Restrictions
It is often assumed that private communal land titles offer greater protection
and more extensive land rights over indigenous lands than does a state-
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395. TOMEI & SWEPSTON, supra note 225.
396. See, e.g., PEDRO GERMÁN NÚÑEZ PALOMINO, DERECHO Y COMUNIDADES CAMPESINAS
EN EL PERÚ 1969-1988 [JUSTICE AND RURAL COMMUNITIES IN PERU 1969-1988] 61 (1996)
(noting that the 1979 constitution of Peru did not allow peasant communities to mortgage their
land or use it as collateral for loans).
397. See, e.g., C.F. art. 231(4) (Braz.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1991 art. 329 (Colom.);
Law No. 426, Nov. 14, 1984, art. 12, Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Formosa No. 2856, at
1 (Arg.); Ley No. 1715, 18 Oct. 1996, Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria [Law of
the National Service of Agrarian Reform] tit. I, ch. I, art. 3(III) (Bol.), available at
http://www.inra.gov.bo/portalv2/Uploads/Normas/ley1715.pdf; Ley No. 19.253, 5 Oct. 1993,
Ley Indígena [Native Law] art. 13 (Chile).
398. This has changed in some countries in Latin America recently.  Four countries have
“removed blanket protections prohibiting the sale of indigenous lands in the 1990s: Nicaragua
(1990), Mexico (1992), El Salvador (1992) and Peru (1993).”  Colchester et al., supra note 190,
at 12.  These changes represent increased neoliberalization of land policy.  Id.
administered system of indigenous reserves.  A closer examination questions
this assumption. 
For example, indigenous “rights of ownership and possession,” as stated in
ILO 169, could not mean exactly the same as the first-generation right to
“ownership” of individual private property as commonly understood.  If “rights
of ownership and possession” meant the same, states could not restrain the
alienation of indigenous title any more than they could that of individual
property owners.395  Indeed, most Latin American countries, and many others,
provide that lands titled communally to indigenous groups are inembargable
(cannot be taken as part of any lien, mortgage foreclosure, or credit judgment),396
imprescriptible (are not susceptible to acquisition by prescription), indivisible
(cannot be subdivided),397 and inalienable (may not be alienated by any type of
title).398  Why is it that some or all of these restrictions on the property rights of
communally held land do not violate prohibitions on discrimination even though
these same restrictions do not apply to land held individually by nonindigenous
people?  The answer to this question involves both traditional indigenous
systems governing communal property and international law. 
First, because the cultural uniqueness of the indigenous groups to whom the
international human right to communal property applies serves as a primary
justification for that right, it includes, as part of the right to culture, the right of
the indigenous group to utilize their traditional land tenure system to control the
land.  Traditional indigenous systems of land tenure often incorporate
substantial communal elements.  One typical prohibition in indigenous land
tenure systems is the prohibition on selling or giving land within the community
to anyone outside of the community.  Thus, the real answer to the question of
why limitations on alienability and severability of title (in the western legal
structure) are not discriminatory is that such limitations on titles granted to
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399. Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land, supra note 79, ¶ 74; PLANT &
HVALKOF, supra note 2, at 8.
400. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1089 (Can.).
401. Id. at 1090 (noting that this seeks to preserve the same nonfungible, noneconomic
values of land that justify granting an indigenous right to property).
402. Id.  at 1091 (“This is not, I must emphasize, a limitation that restricts the use of the land
to those activities that have traditionally been carried out on it.  That would amount to a legal
straitjacket on aboriginal peoples who have a legitimate legal claim to the land.  The approach
I have outlined above allows for a full range of uses of the land, subject only to an overarching
limit, defined by the special nature of the aboriginal title in that land.”).
403.  Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty. & Others, 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) ¶ 52 (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.constitutionallaw.co.za/alert/cases/alexkor.pdf. 
404. Limitations on mortgaging land have similar justifications: mortgaging should be
forbidden because it may lead to loss of indigenous lands, Indigenous Peoples and Their
Relationship to Land, supra note 79, ¶ 48 (saying that use of indigenous land as collateral for
indigenous groups often represent a codification in western law of the traditional
law of the indigenous group itself.
Second, limitations on alienability, severability, and use of land as collateral
may be acceptable from an international law standpoint, because a primary
justification for the international human right to communal property is
protection of the right to culture.  History has demonstrated that
individualization of plots of indigenous land to members of the community has
often led to the demise of the culture of the group.399  The Canadian case of
Delgamuukw clearly presented this justification for title limitations when the
court stated that the past relation of the indigenous group with its land should be
protected from incompatible uses in the future as well, thus limiting acceptable
uses of land to those compatible with past and present practices.400 
Even though the Delgamuukw court’s intentions may have been benign,401
one might also argue this justification for limitations on the use or disposal of
indigenous land by the indigenous owners of the land represents the sort of
paternalism that leads to ossification of the indigenous culture, effectively
preventing the very type of self-determination that control of land could bring.
Delgamuukw supposedly seeks to avoid putting indigenous peoples into a
“straitjacket” with limitations on aboriginal title.402  Indigenous law, however,
like all law, changes in response to other, extra-legal changes. “It is important
to note that indigenous law is not a fixed body of formally classified and easily
ascertainable rules.  By its very nature it evolves as the people who live by its
norms change their patterns of life.”403  Patterns of life for indigenous peoples
change most rapidly at the very times when the indigenous group has increased
interaction with western cultures.  Thus, the limitations on indigenous
communal title may most limit change in indigenous tenure systems at the
moment when indigenous tenure systems may most need to adapt.404
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loans is likely to lead to loss of the land or resources), especially since the indigenous
peoples — some of whom may have less experience in understanding modern lending
practices — may fall victim to unscrupulous lenders.  Some assert that the inability of
indigenous people to access credit with their land as collateral essentially makes their property
“dead capital.”  See, e.g., Robin Edwards, Native Title: Dead Capital?, 2003 SING. J. LEGAL
STUD. 80 (Sing.) (citing to Hernando de Soto’s book, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism
Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, and others).  
405. See, e.g, Rodrigo Sánchez-Mejorada V, Mining Law in Mexico, 9 MIN. RESOURCES
ENGINEERING 129, 130 (2000), available at http://www.smvr.com.mx/art2e.htm (noting that
during the beginning of colonization, current Mexico was subject to the laws of Spain, which
gave ownership of subsurface minerals to the Spanish Crown).
406. See, e.g., CONST. ARG. art. 124; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE BOLIVIA
DE 1967 arts. 136, 139; C.F. art. 20, § 1 (Braz.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE
CHILE DE 1980 art. 19, no. 24; CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1991 art. 332 (Colom.);
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ DE 1972 art. 254.  However, some states
allow for consultation, exploitation, or profit sharing with regard to subsurface resources below
land owned by indigenous groups.  See, e.g., Ley No. 24, 12 Jan. 1996, Por la cual se crea la
Comarca Kuna de Madungandi [By Which the Kuna de Madungandi Region Is Created] ch. II,
art. 2, G.O., 15 Jan. 1996 (Pan.), available at http://www.asamblea.gob.pa/NORMAS/1990/
1996/1996_138_0699.PDF (granting authority to the indigenous people to reach internal
agreements to seek subsurface exploitation concessions from the state); Ley No. 22, 8 Nov.
1983, Por la cual se crea la Comarca Emberá de Darién [By Which the Emberá de Darién
Region Is Created] ch. 4, art. 20, G.O., 17 Jan. 1984 (Pan.) (guaranteeing the indigenous people
in the comarca established by the law the economic and social benefits derived from subsurface
resource exploitation on their land).
407. See, e.g., LILY LA TORRE LÓPEZ, ALL WE WANT IS TO LIVE IN PEACE: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE OIL OPERATIONS IN INDIGENOUS TERRITORIES OF THE PERUVIAN AMAZON
(1999) (detailing how oil exploration in the Amazon has affected indigenous peoples); see also
supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the Yanomami case, in which the govenrment of Brazil approved
a plan for the exploitation of natural resources in the Amazon region without taking adequate
steps to protect the indigenous lands of the region); supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing the Awas
Tingni case, which involved Nicaragua’s exploitation of forestry on indigenous lands); supra
Part IV.C.5 (discussing the Mopan Maya case, in which Belize had granted logging and oil
concessions in indigenous lands).  
C. Subsurface Rights and Other Natural Resources
Many Latin American countries with Spanish or Portuguese colonial histories
typically have property systems in which subsurface mineral rights belong to the
state regardless of private ownership of the land.405  Latin American
constitutions often explicitly provide that the state owns subsurface and other
resource rights.406  State exploitation of subsurface and surface resources on
indigenous land has been a consistent source of violations of the human rights
of indigenous peoples in Latin America and around the world.407
Existing and draft treaties as well as international and domestic cases
contribute to the developing international law determining the rights of
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408. In at least one case, in Africa, a domestic court case recognized the rights of indigenous
peoples to the subsurface below their land.  See Alexkor Ltd. v. Richtersveld Cmty. & Others,
2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.constitutionallaw.co.za/alert/
cases/alexkor.pdf  (noting that even after annexation by the British, the indigenous inhabitants
retained their private property rights to land in accordance with the laws and practices of the
indigenous people; since the indigenous people in question clearly exercised exclusive control
over subsurface rights at the time of annexation, that right survived annexation).  
409. ILO 169, supra note 80, art. 15, para. 2.  
410.  Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 40/04, ¶ 142 (2004), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.
12053eng.htm#_ftn135. 
indigenous peoples to the resources on and beneath their traditional lands.408  For
example, ILO 169 requires governments that retain subsurface rights to take
action to protect the rights of indigenous people:
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-
surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands,
governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which
they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether
and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before
undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or
exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands.  The peoples
concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such
activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of such activities.409
Whether a group has title or occupies land under a reserve system, “one of the
central elements to the protection of indigenous property rights is the
requirement that states undertake effective and fully informed consultations with
indigenous communities regarding acts or decisions that may affect their
traditional territories.”410
The exhortation for state consultation presents the problem of what
constitutes “meaningful consultation.”  Plainly this mandate does not mean that
the indigenous group must have veto authority or the ultimate decision-making
power in such matters.  At the other extreme, the mandate does not mean, for
example, that a government may simply arrive one day on indigenous territory
and announce that the government has granted logging concessions for a portion
of the indigenous group’s land.  Problems arise between these two extremes.
What happens when a government, after negotiations with a private company,
then goes to an indigenous group with a “proposal” to grant a concession for oil
exploration over a substantial portion of the indigenous group’s territory?  Can
any “meaningful consultation” be accomplished once the government and the
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411. The Draft Declaration states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use of their lands, territories and other resources,
including the right to require that States obtain their free and informed consent
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.  Pursuant to agreement with the
indigenous peoples concerned, just and fair compensation shall be provided for
any such activities and measures taken to mitigate adverse environmental,
economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Draft U.N. Declaration, supra note 85, art. 30 (emphasis added).
412. See, e.g., Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra
note 60, art. XVIII, ¶ 4 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to an effective legal framework for
the protection of their rights with respect to the natural resources on their lands, including the
ability to use, manage, and conserve such resources; and with respect to traditional uses of their
lands, interests in lands, and resources, such as subsistence.”); id. art. XVIII, ¶ 5 (“In the event
that ownership of the minerals or resources of the subsoil pertains to the state or that the state
has rights over other resources on the lands, the governments must establish or maintain
procedures for the participation of the peoples concerned in determining whether the interests
of these people would be adversely affected and to what extent, before undertaking or
authorizing any program for planning, prospecting or exploiting existing resources on their
private company have already settled on the details of a deal?  What about
decisions by the government to grant timber concessions on communal lands?
Reasonable attention to the matrix of concerns surrounding the international
human right to property may offer criteria to consider in the substantive standard
for determining whether meaningful consultation has occurred.  The substantive
standard should examine whether consultation has resulted in reasonable
conclusions regarding whether the proposed action would harm the ability of the
indigenous group to maintain the group’s culture and traditions.  Only
meaningful consultation will provide the government or a private entity the
opportunity to understand the use of the land by the indigenous population —
a definite prerequisite to understanding whether a proposed activity would
adversely impact the ability of the indigenous group to exercise its right to
culture and other associated human rights.
Such questions highlight the differences between consultation and consent.
While informed consent cannot take place without meaningful consultation,
meaningful consultation may occur even if consent is not subsequently
forthcoming.  The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples would require “free and informed consent” of indigenous people before
allowing exploitation of natural resources on their land.411  The Organization of
American States’ Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples gives less power to indigenous interests but still offers some amount of
protection.412
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lands.  The peoples concerned shall participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall
receive compensation, on a basis not less favorable than the standard of international law for any
loss which they may sustain as a result of such activities.”); id. art. XXI, ¶ 2 (“Unless
exceptional circumstances so warrant in the public interest, the states shall take necessary
measures to ensure that decisions regarding any plan, program or proposal affecting the rights
or living conditions of indigenous peoples are not made without the free and informed consent
and participation of those peoples, that their preferences are recognized and that no such plan,
program or proposal that could have harmful effects on those peoples is adopted.”).
413. PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 2, at 9.
414. Ley. No. 24, 12 Jan. 1996, Por la cual se crea la Comarca Kuna de Madungandi [By
Which the Kuna de Madungandi Region Is Created] ch. II, art. 2, G.O., 15 Jan. 1996 (Pan.),
available at http://www.asamblea.gob.pa/NORMAS/1990/1996/1996_138_0699.PDF; Decreto
Ejecutivo No. 228, 3 Dec. 1998, Por el cual se adopta la Carta Orgánica Administrativa de la
Comarca Kuna de Madungandi [By Which the Administrative Article of Incorporation of the
Kuna de Madungandi Region Is Adopted], G.O., 8 Dec. 1998 (Pan.), available at http://www.
asamblea.gob.pa/GACETAS/1990/1998/23687_1998.PDF.
415. JAMES HOWE, THE KUNA GATHERING: CONTEMPORARY VILLAGE POLITICS IN PANAMA
55-56 (1986).
Regardless of whether we call the international human right to property sui
generis or view it as simply the logical, nondiscriminatory application of the
first-generation right to property, the right clearly is not the same in application
as the first-generation right to property.  The many limitations to which the right
to communal property is subject make this distinction clear.  The most
problematic of these limitations — the ability of central governments to make
resource-development or other decisions affecting the land of indigenous
peoples without the consent of the “owners” — threatens to relegate the third-
generation right to communal property to status as a second-class right.
VII. Beyond Indigenous Communities: Who May Invoke the Human Right to
Communal Property?
It is not always clear which indigenous groups should be able to avail
themselves of the emerging human right to communal property.413  Some cases
appear relatively clear.  For example, the Kuna Indians of Panama appear to be
a group deserving this protection.  The semi-autonomous Kuna regions of
Panama, while not without vulnerabilities, enjoy a greater level of legitimacy,
recognition, and protection than the land claims of many indigenous groups.414
In large part, this result appears due to the tenacity with which the Kuna have
clung to many elements of their cultural past and to their distrust of outsiders.415
But maintenance of traditional culture is not universal among indigenous
peoples, as many have incorporated attributes of western culture to varying
degrees.  This leads to difficult questions: Should a particular type of land tenure
system or a specific type of relationship with the natural environment form a
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416. Cf. PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 2, at 20 (discussing the complexity and possible
metrics for defining who is indigenous).
417. Id.
418. Id.  Care must also be exercised not to encourage a dynamic in which peasants feel that
indigenous people get “better” treatment than the peasants; rather, the treatment is simply
different with this distinction based on the cultural uniqueness of the indigenous group that may
have developed over a very long period of time.  TOMEI & SWEPSTON, supra note 225.
Conflicts of this type occurred in Colombia as indigenous land received earlier and greater
protection, sometimes incorporating lands of Afro-Colombian peasants.  See, e.g., Etnias de
Colombia, Territorios Colectivos de Comunidades Negras [Collective Territories of Black
Communities], http://www.etniasdecolombia.org/grupos_afro_territorios.asp (last visited May
31, 2007).
419. See supra note 190.
420. See, e.g., Ley No. 1715, 18 Oct. 1996, Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria
[Law of the National Service of Agrarian Reform] tit. III, ch. I, art. 41 (Bol.), available at
http://www.inra.gov.bo/portalv2/Uploads/Normas/ley1715.pdf.  Article 41 of this law states that
“lands of communal origins are the geographic spaces that constitute the habitat of the
indigenous villages and communities that have traditionally had access to the land and that have
developed and maintained their own distinctive forms of economic, social, and cultural norms
such that these have assured the development and survival of the community and their lands.
These lands are inalienable, indivisible, collective, composed of communities, not subject to
mortgage foreclosure, liens, or credit judgments, and may not be acquired through prescription.”
Id. art. 41(I)(5) (translation by authors) (“Las Tierras Comunitarias de Origen son los espacios
geográficos que constituyen el habitat de los pueblos y comunidades indígenas y originarias, a
los cuales han tenido tradicionalmente acceso y donde mantienen y desarrollan sus propias
formas de organización económica, social y cultural, de modo que aseguran su sobrevivencia
y desarrollo.  Son inalienables, indivisibles, irreversibles, colectivas, compuestas por
prerequisite to application of the human right to communal property?416  What
criteria should be used?417  Can minority groups that are not, strictly speaking,
“indigenous” be considered if their tenure system is sufficiently “communal”?418
This Part examines different criteria relevant to these questions and concludes
that a functioning land tenure system, with at least some communal aspect, that
demonstrates cultural uniqueness should form the main determinant of who may
invoke the right to communal property.
Dispossession, coupled with cultural and racial discrimination, may explain
why indigenous peoples comprise the dominant force for a human right to
communal property, particularly when the indigenous groups retain a current
culture and way of life similar to how they lived historically.  The importance
of indigenous culture also contributes to an understanding of the basis for a sui
generis approach to indigenous property rights.  Questions become more
difficult when groups that may not be “indigenous”419 begin to assert the human
right to communal property.  Bolivia’s Agrarian Law resolves this issue by
recognizing the communal property of both indigenous communities and
communities that do not identify themselves as indigenous.420  Afro-
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comunidades o mancomunidades, inembargables e imprescriptibles.”).
421. See generally CLARE RIBANDO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBL’N NO. 05-RL-32713,
AFRO-LATINOS IN LATIN AMERICA AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY (2005), available at
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=460484.  Afro-Caribbean collective
land movements have been particularly strong in Nicaragua, Honduras, Colombia, and Brazil.
All of these countries, and Ecuador, have passed laws providing for special land rights for
certain Afro-Caribbeans.  Eva T. Thorne, Land Rights and Garífuna Identity, NACLA REP. ON
AM., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 21, 22-23 (citing C.F. art. 68 (Braz.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA
REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR DE 1998 art. 83; Ley No. 70, 27 Aug. 1993, Por la cual se desarrolla
el artículo transitorio 55 de la Constitución Política [By Which Transitory Article 55 of the
Political Constitution Is Developed], D.O., 31 Aug. 1993 (Colom.)), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/humanrights/adjudicating/papers/ThorneArticl
e-yes.pdf. 
422. See generally Diaz, supra note 78.
423. In Spanish: comunidades negras. 
424. Nicaragua also has a law allowing communal land claims of Afro-Caribbean peoples.
Ley No. 445, 13 Dec. 2002, Ley del Régimen de Propiedad Comunal de los Pueblos Indígenas
y Comunidades Étnicas de las Regiones Autónomas de la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua y de los
Ríos Bocay, Coco, Indio y Maíz [Communal Property Law of the Native Towns and Ethnic
Communities of the Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua and of the Bocay,
Coco, Indio, and Maíz Rivers], L.G., 23 Jan. 2003 (Nicar.), available at http://legislacion.
asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/d0c69e2c91d9955906256a400077164a/f59730333b3f6fa50
62571b200559533?OpenDocument.  
425. See, e.g, CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1991 art. 55 (Colom.) (“Within the two years
following the entry into effect of the present Constitution, Congress will issue . . . a law which
will recognize the right to collective property of the Black communities which occupy
uncultivated lands in the rural zones adjoining the rivers of the Pacific Basin, in accordance with
their traditional cultivation practices.  This law will apply to the area stipulated therein.”
(translation by authors)).
426. Ley No. 70, 27 Aug. 1993 (Colom.).
427. Etnias de Colombia, supra note 418.
Caribbean peoples also claim land communally in various parts of Latin
America.421  Communal tenancy of the land often represents the single most
important identifying factor for some of these nonindigenous groups.422  
In another illustrative example, special communal land rights have been given
to “black communities”423 in Colombia.  Examination of the legal regime for
recognition of “black communities” in Colombia helps shed light on criteria for
determining what sort of nonindigenous social organizations might be in a
favorable position to assert the human right to communal property.424  In
Colombia the government and constitution have recognized “black
communities” and their rights to the land they inhabit.425  The Colombian
congress passed an implementing law on August 27, 1993,426 and from 1995 to
1999, 1,532,099 hectares of land were communally titled to black communities
under this law.427  The law sought to recognize black communities that had been
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428. In Spanish: tierras baldías.
429. Ley No. 70, 27 Aug. 1993, art. 1 (Colom.).
430. Id. art. 4 (requiring that the land be “tierras baldías”).
431. Id. 
432. Id. art. 2, § 5 (“Comunidad Negra. Es el conjunto de familias de ascendencia
afrocolombiana que poseen una cultura propia, comparten una historia y tienen sus propias
tradiciones y costumbres dentro de la relación campo-poblado, que revelan y conservan
conciencia de identidad que las distinguen de otros grupos étnicos.”).
433. Id. art. 2, § 6 (stating that collective occupation means the historic and ancestral black
communities on lands used collectively by them and where they currently engage in their
traditional production practices:  “Ocupación Colectiva.  Es el asentamiento histórico y ancestral
de comunidades negras en tierras para su uso colectivo, que constituyen su hábitat, y sobre los
cuales desarrollan en la actualidad sus prácticas tradicionales de producción.”).
434. Id. art. 4.
435. In many cases ethnic or racial groups form bonds to the land that resemble those of
indigenous groups.  Jennifer Goett, Informe del Desarollo Humana de la Costa Atlantica de
Nicarauga: Tenencia de las tierras comunales indigenas y afro-descendientes en la RAAS
[Report on the Human Development of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua: Indigenous and Afro-
Descendent Communal Land Tenure in the South Atlantic Autonomous Region] 5 (Apr. 28-29,
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/
humanrights/adjudicating/papers/JenniferGoettPNUD.doc (noting the similarity of ties with the
land in Nicaragua between indigenous and Afro-Caribbean groups).
occupying “empty lands”428 in accordance with their traditional production
methods and the right to communal property, in order to protect the cultural and
ethnic identity of these groups as well as to foment their social and economic
development.429
Recognition of a right to communal property under this Colombian law
demands several prerequisites.  First, the land occupied by the community must
be considered “empty” rural land owned by the state.430  Second, there must a
“black community” occupying the land.431  A “black community” is defined in
the law as a group of families of African descent that possess their own culture,
shared history, unique customs, and traditions of the relation between land and
population, all of which reveal and conserve an identity that distinguishes them
from other ethnic groups.432  This definition of “black community” demonstrates
the important emphasis on a unique culture.  Furthermore, the collective nature
of land holding forms an integral part of that unique culture.433  Third, and
finally, the community must be occupying the land in accordance with their
traditional production practices.434 
Despite the fact that the Afro-Latino communities described above are not
“indigenous” in the usual conception of the word,435 the focus on their cultural
uniqueness seems to be the driving force behind their claim of a right to
recognition of their communal property.  Also, like the communal property
rights granted to indigenous peoples, the land of the black communities has
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436. Ley No. 70, 27 Aug. 1993, art. 7 (Colom.).
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. See C.F. art. 68 (Braz.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR DE
1998 art. 83; Ley No. 70, 27 Aug. 1993 (Colom.); Ley No. 445, 13 Dec. 2002, Ley del Régimen
de Propiedad Comunal de los Pueblos Indígenas y Comunidades Étnicas de las Regiones
Autónomas de la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua y de los Ríos Bocay, Coco, Indio y Maíz
[Communal Property Law of the Native Towns and Ethnic Communities of the Autonomous
Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua and of the Bocay, Coco, Indio, and Maíz Rivers],
L.G., 23 Jan. 2003 (Nicar.), available at http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/
d0c69e2c91d9955906256a400077164a/f59730333b3f6fa5062571b200559533?Open
Document.
similar limitations on its title.  Typically, the portion of the land designated for
community use cannot be alienated, taken by prescription, or subject to a lien or
mortgage.436  In Colombia, portions of land designated by internal regulations
to specific families in nonindigenous groups may only be alienated due to
dissolution of the family or other reasons noted in internal regulations.437  The
right to occupy lands designated to families even upon dissolution remains
limited to members of the community or, failing that, to members of the same
ethnic group.438
While the basis for the international human right to communal property
cannot always be neatly categorized because the right serves to protect so many
other rights, the existence of a current and viable communal system of land
tenure is the most important indicator of whether or not a group may claim
territory under the right to communal property.  Though a functioning land
tenure system different from that of the official legal system is itself culturally
unique, it may be less compelling if the group otherwise exhibits political,
religious, familial, and social traits typical in the rest of the dominant society.
On the other hand, general cultural uniqueness combined with a shared group
history makes a more compelling case.  In countries such as Colombia, Ecuador,
Brazil, and Nicaragua, domestic law creates a right to communal property for
certain Afro-Caribbeans,439 yet the question remains as to whether there exists
an independent international human right to communal territory for such groups
(as was found for the Maya in the Mopan Maya case).
These various situations and cases demonstrate the virtual impossibility of
drawing a bright line based on one criterion that justifies applying the dominant
western law of property to one group (i.e., the first-generation right to property)
while assigning a substantially different right to communal property to another
group (i.e., the international human right to communal property).  The
importance of the rights at stake requires that one closely examine the factors
contributing to a decision as to who enjoys a human right to communal property.
Some factors to examine when determining to which groups the international
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440. See Andy White, Introduction to LYNN ELLSWORTH & ANDY WHITE, DEEPER ROOTS:
STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY TENURE SECURITY AND COMMUNITY LIVELIHOODS 6 (2004).
441. The efficacy of a common property regime “is indicated by the degree to which
community rules and resource boundaries are accepted as legitimate, are clear cut and enforced,
and by whether communities can practice exclusion, adapt to new situations and deal effectively
with external forces, particularly the government.”  Id. at 12-13.
human right to communal property applies include: race, history, culture,
religion, types of use of the land, and traditional tenure practices.
VIII. Conclusion
Analysis of land tenure and land rights has progressed far beyond the
bifurcation of either private property or open access as represented in Garrett
Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons.  Scholars from many fields have
cataloged the complexity and subtlety of many land tenure systems once treated
with scorn as “primitive.”  For example, in both conservation and international
development, experts have come to appreciate that communal property holds an
important place in both fields because many impoverished people depend on
forest resources that were traditionally held communally, and many of these
areas are some of the most biologically diverse areas on earth.440
Over the past two decades, the inter-American human rights system has given
increased attention to the indigenous peoples’ right to property as it becomes
impossible to ignore the injustices surrounding the frequent dispossession of
lands belonging to indigenous peoples and the concomitant impact to the culture,
economy, religion, and physical environment of indigenous people.  This
attention has culminated in the explicit recognition of the human right to
communal property for indigenous groups in many nations.  Examination of the
roots of this progression in law and jurisprudence from other parts of the world
evidences two primary possible foundations for the protection of indigenous
rights to property.  First, the right to communal property may rest on the
argument that true nondiscrimination (i.e., recognition of the legal
systems/norms of other cultures) coupled with the classic, western protection of
private property results in the human right to communal property for certain
groups.  Second, the right to communal property of indigenous people may be
sui generis — so unique that it is without precedent or comparison.
 Regardless of the justification and the legal reasoning behind them, both
approaches appear to acknowledge that the most important single criterion for
recognition of a communal right to property is the extent of a unique,
functioning tenure system that is understood, accepted, and controlled by the
local community and is distinct from the dominant property paradigm.441  Thus,
in part, recognition of such customary communal land tenure makes sense from
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442. Id. at 14.
a pragmatic perspective.  In fact, imposition of typical “western” land tenure in
place of unique, established local land tenure systems may increase conflict and
make development assistance even more difficult.442
Access to communal property involves a plethora of human rights not usually
associated with the more narrow interpretation of the first generation or
“negative” right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of property.  This
“association” of the international human right to communal property with other
human rights constitutes the greatest difference between the human right to
communal property and the typical “negative” right to property.  The myriad
human rights potentially gathered under the umbrella of a human right to
communal property even gives rise to an analogy with a western image of
property as a bundle of rights.  Just as traditional western notions of the bundle
of property rights includes “sticks,” such as the right to exclude, the right to use,
and the right to sell, the international human right to property includes other
human rights that may often only be exercised under the protection of the right
to property.  For instance, where places and land are sacred the right to free
exercise of religion may be involved.  When the culture revolves around
agriculture or hunting and gathering, a right to culture may only be fulfilled by
protecting the right to communal property.
Examination of the communal right to property results in the rather surprising
conclusion that, from a legally formalistic viewpoint, it matters little whether
indigenous groups that enjoy the right have a legal title or live under a
reservation system.  While one may think that title would grant greater rights
and protections, the many limitations on titles as well as the common practice
in Latin America of the state maintaining subsurface — and sometimes even
surface resource — rights actually means that even titled communal lands have
few of the same legal protections offered to individual private property.
Communally titled lands, like reservation lands, are primarily protected by the
political process: what price will the government pay for the effects it imposes
on property occupied or used by virtue of a communal right?  If the answer is
that the government will pay no political price either domestically or
internationally, then communal property, whether held by title or under a
reservation system, is at risk.
The communal right to property has primarily been driven by the concerted
efforts of indigenous rights groups.  Other culturally, ethnically isolated groups
have also gained communal tenure rights through domestic legislation in some
countries.  This expansion of the human right to communal property seems
logical in light of the reasoning behind recognition of rights to communal
property.
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443. See MARÍA TERESA VÁZQUEZ CASTILLO, LAND PRIVATIZATION IN MEXICO:
URBANIZATION, FORMATION OF REGIONS, AND GLOBALIZATION IN EJIDOS 173-76 (2004);
Grenville Barnes, The Evolution and Resilience of Community-Based Land Tenure in Rural
Mexico, 25 LAND USE POL’Y (forthcoming 2008) (Neth.) (“Even though PROCEDE has
certified more than 90% of the ejidos in the country, it has been estimated that only 5.3% of all
ejidos have acquired dominio pleno, most of these being urban ejidos.” (citing Fernando
Galeana Rodríguez, Demanda del dominio pleno en el ejido: derechos de propiedad y crédito
rural [Demands for Complete Dominion in the Ejido: Property Rights and Rural Credit],
ESTUDIOS AGRARIOS, May-Aug. 2005, at 19 (Mex.), available at http://www.pa.gob.mx/
publica/rev_29/fernando.pdf)).
444. Álvaro Velasco Álvarez, Colombia: Communidades Indígenas y  Negras Raizales
Contra la Guerra, 18 (Feb. 23-25, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
latam.ufl.edu/news/conf-papers/alvarezpaperforconf06.pdf.
445. BEHAR, supra note 38, at 189-264.
All the developments surrounding the human right to communal property
give new insight into the Evolutionary Theory of Property.  This theory asserts
that communal land represents a “primitive” step in land tenure evolution that
is eventually replaced by a turn to individualized private property.  Yet
communal land tenure has proven surprisingly resilient.  Despite neoliberal
reforms to property law in Mexico in 1992, the expected rush to individualize
communal ejido lands has not yet materialized.443  In Colombia, the 1991
constitution and subsequent laws have resulted in approximately a fifth of the
surface area of Colombia becoming land held communally by either indigenous
groups or black communities.444  Some areas in Europe have resisted the change
from communal to individualized property for centuries.445
In modern Latin America, many indigenous, ethnic, and racial groups have
won formal legal recognition of tenure practices that incorporate communal
aspects.  This recognition does not mean that the amount of land actually
managed communally is increasing.  It does, however, seem clear that the
amount of land legally recognized as being held and managed communally is
increasing.  The question then becomes whether lands so recognized will
endure.
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